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Abstract
We propose a semiparametric method to estimate the density of private values in first-price
auctions. Specifically, we model private values through a set of conditional moment restrictions
and use a two-step procedure. In the first step we recover a sample of pseudo private values
using Local Polynomial Estimator. In the second step we use a GMM procedure to estimate the
parameter(s) of interest. We show that the proposed semiparametric estimator is consistent, has
an asymptotic normal distribution, and attains the parametric (“root-n”) rate of convergence.
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1 Introduction
From a theoretical point of view, auctions are modeled as games of incomplete information in which
asymmetric information among players (seller/buyer and bidders) is one of the key features, Krishna
(2002); McAfee and McMillan (1987); Wilson (1992). From an applied perspective, as auction is a
widely used mechanism to allocate goods and services, many data sets are available for empirical
research. By assuming that observed bids are the equilibrium outcomes of an underlying auction
model under consideration, the structural approach to provides a framework analyze auction data
in which the theoretical model and its empirical counterpart are closely related. The main objective
of this approach is then to recover the structural elements of the auction model. This line of
research has been considerably developed in the last fifteen years. The difficulties in estimating
auction models are many. First, auction models lead to nonlinear econometric models through the
equilibrium strategies. Second, auction models may not lead to a closed-form solution making the
derivation of an econometric model even more difficult. Third, the estimation of auction models
often requires the numerical computation of the equilibrium strategies. Some important work in this
are documented by Perrigne and Vuong (1999); Paarsch and Hong (2006); Athey and Haile (2007);
Perrigne and Vuong (2008), among others.
We distinguish two methods for estimating structural auction models: direct method and indi-
rect method. Direct methods were developed first, and they rely on parametric econometric models.
Starting from a specification of the underlying distribution of private values, the objective of di-
rect methods is to estimate the parameter vector characterizing such a distribution. Within this
class of methods, there are two major estimation procedures. The first methodology, introduced by
Paarsch (1992); Donald and Paarsch (1993), is a fully parametric setup that uses Maximum Like-
lihood based estimation procedures requiring the computation of the equilibrium strategy. Since
it is computationally demanding, (see Donald and Paarsch, 1993), only very simple distributions
are considered in practice. Moreover, because the support of the bid distribution depends on the
estimated parameter(s), it has a nonstandard limiting distribution, (see Hirano and Porter, 2003).
In view of this, Donald and Paarsch (1993) develop a piecewise pseudo maximum-likelihood esti-
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mator requiring the computation of the equilibrium strategy that can be obtained using specific
parametric distribution(s). Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) introduced the second methodology,
which is computationally more convenient. Relying on the revenue equivalence theorem, the au-
thors propose a simulation-based method that avoids computation of the equilibrium strategy, and
therefore allows for more general parametric specifications for the value distribution.
More recently Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) (hereafter, GPV (2000)) developed an alter-
native, fully nonparametric indirect procedure. This methodology relies on a simple but crucial
observation that, using the first-order condition of the bidder’s optimization problem, the value can
be expressed as a function of the (corresponding) bid, and the distribution and density of observed
bids. This function, which is the inverse of the equilibrium strategy, identifies the model nonpara-
metrically. Therefore, in contrast to the direct method, this method starts from the distribution of
observed bids in order to estimate the distribution of unobserved private values without computing
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy or its inverse. This naturally calls for a two-step procedure.
In the first step, a sample of pseudo private values is obtained while using (say) kernel estimators
for the distribution and density of observed bids. In the second step, this sample of pseudo values
is used to nonparametrically estimate its density.1
Though a fully nonparametric (Kernel) estimator is flexible and robust to misspeficiation, it has
few drawbacks. It has slow rate of convergence, which makes it hard to accommodate a multidi-
mensional auction covariates ( curse of dimensionality) and it is ill-behaved at the boundaries of the
support. To address these problems, we we propose a semiparametric procedure where the first step
is fully nonparametric, in that we use Local Polynomial Estimation (LPE) of Fan and Gijbels (1996),
instead of Kernel, to obtain the bid density and distribution, and in the second step we model private
values through a set of conditional moment restrictions and estimate the (finite) parameters using
generalized method of moments (GMM). We then derive the asymptotic properties of the estimator.
The advantage of using LPE is that it is well-behaved at the boundary, and by using conditional mo-
ment restrictions we can accommodate a large number of covariates, making our method useful for
1GPV (2000) also establish uniform consistency and, using the minimax theory as developed by
Ibragimov and Has’minskii (1981), determine the optimal rate of convergence of this estimator.
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applied work. See for example Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003); Rezende (2008); Li and Zheng
(2009); Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011); Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011); Athey, Coey, and Levin
(2013); Groeger (2014) who have used similar, either fully-parametric or semi parametric, indirect
moment based procedure to accommodate a large number of covariates. None of them, however,
provide any asymptotic properties for their estimator. We contribute to this literature by showing
that our procedure is consistent, asymptotically normal and achieves parametric rate of convergence.
For notational tractability and relatively cleaner exposition we focus primarily on symmetric
first-price sealed-bid auction models with independent private value and a non-binding reserve
price. Once the asymptotic properties of this simple case has been characterized, extending the es-
timation procedure to accommodate more general auction environment is tedious but conceptually
straightforward – only the asymptotic variance will change, not the rate of convergence. More gen-
erally, our method extends to models estimated using a nonparametric indirect procedure including
auctions with asymmetric bidders.
Let Vpℓ, p = 1, . . . , Iℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L denote the private value of the pth bidder for the ℓth
auctioned object. Let Zℓ ≡ (Xℓ, Iℓ) ∈ Rd+1 denote the vector of exogenous variables, it includes
auction covariates Xℓ and the number of bidders Iℓ. To model the private values, we posit that there
is some known and sufficiently smooth function M(·, ·; θ) : Rd+2 → Rq and parameter vector θ ∈ Rp
such that, q ≥ p and at some true parameter θ0 the values satisfy the following set of conditional
moment restrictions
E[M(V,Z; θ0)|Z] = 0, (1)
where the expectation is with respect to the value distribution F (·|Z; θ0, γ0) with γ0 as the (possibly
infinite dimensional) nuisance parameter. These moment conditions are, however, infeasible because
V are unobserved. But, in equilibrium, the bid B = s(V,Z; θ0, γ0), where s(·) is the bidding strategy
that depends on the parameter vector θ0 both directly through B, since B ∼ G(·|Z; θ0, γ0) (say),
and indirectly through V , since V ∼ F (·|Z; θ0, γ0). This means (1) can be naturally expressed as
E
{
M [s−1(B,Z; θ0, γ0), Z; θ0]
∣∣Z} = 0, which requires the computation of the equilibrium strategy
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as well as of its inverse. This could be computationally demanding for two different reasons. First,
such computation has to be carried out for any trial value of the parameters (θ, γ). Second, in
a more general class of auction models, such as when values are affiliated or when bidders are
asymmetric, the computation of the equilibrium strategy s(·, ·; θ0, γ0) and of its inverse is much
more involved and costly. Therefore, we propose to replace V in Equation (1) by its nonparametric
(local polynomial) estimator Vˆ = ξˆ(B,Z) (and not inverse strategy) to make the moment condition
feasible and operational. Thus the feasible conditional moment restriction becomes
E
{
M [ξˆ(B,Z), Z; θ0]
∣∣Z} ≈ 0.
We propose a two-step semiparametric procedure: first, we use LPE to obtain the nonparametric
estimator of the value Vˆ = ξˆ(B,Z); second we use GMM procedure to obtain an estimate for θ0.
Unlike the most widely used Parzen-Rosenblatt Kernel based estimator, LPE is not ill-behaved close
to the support boundaries (see Fan and Gijbels, 1996) and hence we do not have to trim any bids.
This provides a remarkable advantage to our procedure, since otherwise we would have to trim bids,
which are endogenous variables, which would then imply an automatic trimming on private values,
thereby affecting the moments. In a standard econometric framework only exogenous variables are
trimmed, Lavergne and Vuong (1996); Robinson (1988). We show that our estimator is consistent,
asymptotically normal and converges uniformly at the parametric
√
L rate.
As it is well known that nonparametric estimators converge at a slower rate than
√
L and
their rates are negatively related to the dimension of the vector of exogenous variables, the so-
called curse of dimensionality. This makes these estimators less desirable in applications, especially
when a limited number of observations is available and/or when the number of exogenous vari-
ables is relatively large.2 Our estimator does not have this drawback because its convergence
rate is independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables. A second major advantage of
our estimation procedure is that, even though we focus on symmetric, inpdendent private value
2Examples of semiparametric estimators attaining
√
L rate can be found in Newey and McFadden (1994); Powell
(1994). An example of a semiparametric estimator converging at a slower than the parametric rate but not subject to
the curse of dimensionality – its rate is independent of d – is given by Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2011).
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auctions without reserve price, our method provides a framework for a (moment based) semipara-
metric procedure that can be used to estimate more general auction such as auctions with binding
announced or random reserve price, Li and Perrigne (2003), symmetric and asymmetric affiliated
values, Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002); Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003), as long as the moment
conditions are sufficiently smooth (defined later). This rules out moment conditions that are based
on quantiles.3
In an short extension, we show how the semiparametric procedure can be applied to these
auctions, including auctions with unobserved heterogeneity Krasnokutskaya (2011). As it will be
clear, allowing these features will affect the asymptotic variance but not the rate of convergence,
except when auctions have unobserved heterogeneity. This is because to accommodate unobserved
heterogeneity we need a three-step semiparametric procedure – the new step is to estimate the
density of the unobserved heterogeneity using empirical characteristics function. So it is not clear
whether we can even achieve the
√
L consistency, but a proper analysis of asymptotic properties of
such semiparametric estimator beyond the scope of our paper and is left for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the theoretical model,
from which the structural econometric model and our semiparametric estimator is derived. Section 3
establishes the asymptotic properties of our estimator, and 4 presents some Monte Carlo experiments
to illustrate the properties of our procedure. Section 5 proposes some extension, and we conclude
in Section 6. The Appendix collects the proofs of our results.
2 The Model
2.1 The Symmetric IPV Model
We present the benchmark theoretical model underlying our structural econometric model, namely
the symmetric IPV model with a non-binding reserve price. Although this is somehow restrictive
for applications, it allows us to develop our econometric procedure in a more transparent way. A
3For examples of use of quantiles in empirical auctions see Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003);
Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2013); Gimenes (2014).
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single and indivisible object is auctioned to Iℓ risk neutral bidders who are assumed to be ex ante
identical. The total number of bidders may vary across auctions. Private values are denoted by
V and we assume that each valuation Vpℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, p = 1, . . . , Iℓ, is distributed according
to F (·|Zℓ; θ0, γ0), where θ0 ∈ Rp is the parameter of interest and γ0 is a nuisance parameter that
could be infinite or finite dimensional or even an empty set. The support of F (·|·) is [V ℓ, V ℓ], with
0 ≤ V ℓ = V (Zℓ) < V ℓ = V (Zℓ) <∞. Among others, Riley and Samuelson (1981) have shown that
for every ℓ, Iℓ ≥ 2 the equilibrium bid Bpℓ in the ℓth auction is given by
Bpℓ = s0(Vpℓ, Zℓ) = Vpℓ − 1
F (Vpℓ|Zℓ; θ0, γ0)Iℓ−1
∫ Vpℓ
V ℓ
F (v|Zℓ; θ0, γ0)Iℓ−1dv, (2)
where s(·, ·) is the unique symmetric Bayes Nash Equilibrium strategy that is monotonic and differ-
entiable. Let G(·|Zℓ; θ0, γ0) ≡ G0(·|Zℓ) and g(·|Zℓ; θ0, γ0) ≡ g0(·|Zℓ) be the distribution and density
of observed bids in the ℓth auction, respectively. From GPV (2000), values V can be identified as
Vpℓ = ξ0(Bpℓ, Zℓ) = Bpℓ +
1
Iℓ − 1
G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ) , p = 1, . . . , Iℓ; ℓ = 1, . . . , L. (3)
2.2 The Two Step Estimator
Similar to GPV (2000), (3) forms the basis for our econometric model. The difference with GPV
(2000) is to model private values as a set of moment conditions. Therefore knowledge of G0(·|·) and
g0(·|·) would lead us to a GMM framework. However, these functions are unknown in practice but
can be easily estimated from observed bids. This suggests the following two-step procedure.
In the first step we recover a sample of pseudo private values by using nonparametric LPE. The
second step departs from the nonparametric second step of GPV (2000) since we use (parametric)
GMM procedure to obtain an estimator for θ0 instead. Before presenting our two-step estimator, it is
worth mentioning that some of our assumptions are similar or even identical to those in GPV (2000).
This is not surprising since our methodology follows closely their methodology. In particular we
follow GPV (2000) and indicate when some modifications are necessary. Our first two assumptions
deal with the data generating process and the smoothness of the latent joint distribution of (Vpℓ, Zℓ).
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Assumption A1:
(i) Zℓ = (Xℓ, Iℓ) ∈ Rd+1, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , L are independently and identically distributed as Fm(·, ·)
with density fm(·, ·).
(ii) For each ℓ, Vpℓ, p = 1, . . . , Iℓ are independently and identically distributed conditionally on
Zℓ as F (·|·; θ0, γ0) with density f(·|·; θ0, γ0), where θ0 ∈ Rp and γ0 can be finite or infinite
dimensional or empty.
Let I be the set of possible values for Iℓ. We use S(∗) to denote the support of ∗, and use SI(∗) to
denote the support when there are I bidders.4
Assumption A2: I is a bounded subset of {2, 3, . . .}, and
(i) For each I ∈ I, Si(F ) = {(v, x) : x ∈ [x, x], v ∈ [v(x), v(x)]}, with x < x,
(ii) For (v, x, I) ∈ S(F ), f(v|x, I; θ0, γ0) ≥ cf > 0, and for (x, I) ∈ S(Fm), fm(x, I) ≥ cf > 0,
(iii) For each I ∈ I, F (·|·, I; θ0, γ0) and fm(·, I) admit up to R + 1 continuous bounded partial
derivatives on SI(F ) and SI(Fm), with R > d+ 1.
These assumptions can be found in GPV (2000) as well, though A2-(iii) is stronger in our case. That
is, we require R to be sufficiently large with respect to the dimension of X, i.e. R > d + 1, which
is commonly used in the semiparametric literature, see Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989) among
others. The next two assumptions are on kernels and bandwidths used in the first stage.
Assumption A3:
(i) The kernels KG(·), K1g(·) and K2g(·) are symmetric with bounded hypercube supports and
twice continuously bounded derivatives.
(ii)
∫
KG(x)dx = 1,
∫
K1g(x)dx = 1,
∫
K2g(b)db = 1.
4We use the notation Iℓ (with the subscript ℓ) to denote that there are Iℓ-many bidders in the ℓ
th auction, and I
(without the subscript ℓ) to denote an auction with I-many bidders. For example, suppose there are L = 3 auctions,
with 2, 3 and 2 bidders in auction ℓ = 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Here ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, I1 = 2, I2 = 3 and I3 = 2 and simply
I = 2 refers to auctions with 2 bidders, which is either auction 1 or 3.
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(iii) KG(·), K1g(·) and K2g(·) are of the order (R− 1).
Assumption A4: The bandwidths hG, h1g and h2g satisfy:
(i) hG → 0 and Lh
d
G
logL
→∞, as L→∞,
(ii) h1g → 0, h2g → 0 and
Lhd1gh2g
logL
→∞, as L→∞.
For simplicity of presentation and tractability of the notations, in the remainder of the paper
we will consider only univariate X, i.e., d = 1, except in the Monte Carlo section when we consider
d = 2. Since we prove that the rate of convergence is independent of d (Proposition 2) all the
asymptotic results will work for d > 0 except for the form of asymptotic variance, because when
we move from d = 1 to d > 1, we only have to adapt the dimension of the regressor, the degree of
polynomial and the asymptotic variance. See (Ruppert and Wand, 1994, section 3) for an example
of how to specify a polynomial with d = 2.
In order to describe our two–step estimator, we observe first that, our objective is to estimate
the ratio ψ(·|·) = G0(·|·)/g0(·|·) by ψˆ = Gˆ(·|·)/gˆ(·|·) (see equation (3)) using LPE for each function.
From Proposition 1 in GPV (2000) we know that G0(·|·) is R+ 1 times continuously differentiable
on its entire support and therefore g0(·|·) is R times continuously differentiable on its entire support
as well.5 Given the smoothness of each function we propose to use a LPE(R), i.e. a LPE of
degree R, for G0(·|·) and a LPE(R − 1) for g0(·|·). For consistency of the first step it is possible to
choose the optimal bandwidths à la Stone (1982). However, unlike GPV (2000) we do not need to
specify a “boundary bandwidth” since the local polynomial method does not require knowledge of
the location of the endpoints of the support. Therefore, it is not necessary to estimate the boundary
of the support of the bid distribution.
5Observe that by Proposition 1 in GPV (2000) we also know that the conditional density g0(·|·) is R + 1 times
continuously differentiable on a closed subset of the interior of the support. Thus the degree of smoothness close to
the boundaries and at the boundaries of the support is not R + 1.
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Let Pρ(X;β) denote a polynomial of degree ρ in X with parameter β. Then for each each I,
Gˆ(b|x) = argmin
βG
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
I∑
p=1
{
Y Gpℓ − PR(Xℓ − x;βG)
}2 1
hG
KG
(
Xℓ − x
hG
)
gˆ(b|x) = argmin
βg
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
I∑
p=1
{
Y gpℓ − PR−1(Xℓ − x;βg)
}2 1
h1g
K1g
(
Xℓ − x
h1g
)
,
where Y Gpℓ = 1(Bpl ≤ b) andY gpℓ = 1h2gK2g
(
Bpℓ−b
h2g
)
. More precisely we have,
Gˆ(b|x, I) = 1
hG
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
I∑
p=1
eT1 (X
T
I,R+1W
G
x XI,R+1)
−1XR+1,ℓKG
(
Xℓ − x
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ b)
=
1
LhG
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
I∑
p=1
eT1
(
XTI,R+1W
G
x XI,R+1
nI
)−1
XR+1,ℓKG
(
Xℓ − x
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ b); (4)
gˆ(b|x, I) = 1
h1gh2g
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
I∑
p=1
eT1 (X
T
I,RW
g
xXI,R)
−1XR,ℓK1g
(
Xℓ − x
h1g
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ − b
h2g
)
=
1
Lh1gh2g
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
I∑
p=1
eT1
(
XTI,RW
g
xXI,R
nI
)−1
XR,ℓK1g
(
Xℓ − x
h1g
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ − b
h2g
)
,(5)
where for ι ∈ {R,R + 1}, e1 is the unit vector in Rι containing a 1 in its first entry, nI = ILI ,
LI = #{ℓ : Iℓ = I}, Xι,ℓ = [1 (Xℓ − x) . . . (Xℓ − x)ι−1]T is a ι× 1 vector,
XI,ι =


1 (X1 − x) . . . (X1 − x)ι−1
...
...
...
...
1 (XnI − x) . . . (XnI − x)ι−1


is the nI × ι matrix of regressors with the first I rows identical and similarly for the other rows,
WGx = diag
{
1
hG
KG
(
Xℓ − x
hG
)}
; W gx = diag
{
1
h1g
K1g
(
Xℓ − x
h1g
)}
,
where KG(·), K1g(·) and K2g(·) are some kernels with bounded support and hG, h1g,h2g are some
bandwidths (see Assumptions A3 and A4). Given (4) and (5), the (pseudo) private value is given
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by
Vˆpℓ = Bpℓ +
1
Iℓ − 1 ψˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ). (6)
Unlike in GPV (2000), ψˆ is not subject to the so-called boundary effect, a typical problem encoun-
tered in kernel estimation, and hence we do not need to trim out observations that are “too close” to
the boundary of the support of the joint distribution of (Bpℓ, Zℓ). The second step of our estimation
procedure is as follows. We propose to use the sample of pseudo private values in the following
conditional moment restrictions, namely
E
[
M(Vˆ , Z; θ0)
∣∣Z] ≈ 0,
for some known function M(·, ·; θ) : R3 → Rq and θ ∈ Rp with q ≥ p. For example, we could use
E[ln(Vpℓ) | Zℓ] = θ′0,1Zℓ. (7)
V ar[ln(Vpℓ) | Zℓ] = [exp(θ′0,2Zℓ)]2. (8)
as the moment conditions, like in Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011); Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis
(2014). This set of conditional moment restrictions translates into the following set of unconditional
moment restrictions,
E
[
m(Vˆ , Z; θ0)
] ≈ 0, (9)
where m(·, ·; θ) : R3 → Rq is known. In view of (9), we propose to estimate θ0 by θˆ, where
θˆ = argmin
θ∈Θ
SˆTL (θ)ΩSˆL(θ), (10)
where SˆL(θ) = 1/L
∑L
ℓ=1 1/Iℓ
∑Iℓ
p=1m(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ) and Ω is a positive definite matrix of order q. Ide-
ally, one would like to specify the following set of conditional moment restrictions E[M(V,Z; θ0)|Z] =
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0, which would lead to the unconditional moment restrictions E[m(V,Z; θ0)] = 0. Therefore, if
SL(θ) = 1/L
∑L
ℓ=1 1/Iℓ
∑Iℓ
p=1m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ) the infeasible estimator θ˜, (say), is such that
θ˜ = argmin
θ∈Θ
STL (θ)ΩSL(θ).
Remark– The asymptotic distributions of the feasible estimator θˆ and the infeasible estimator θ˜
are closely related, but are not the same, see Proposition 2.
3 Asymptotic Properties
In this section we show that our two-step semiparametric estimator θˆ of θ0 is consistent and asymp-
totically normal distributed. Moreover, we establish that our estimator attains the parametric
uniform rate of convergence given an appropriate choice of the bandwidths used in the first step
to estimate G0(·|·) and g0(·|·). As we will discuss below the optimal bandwidths, given by Stone
(1982), i.e. the one-step bandwidths, cannot be chosen, instead our choice implies that in practice
one needs to undersmooth. We also discuss the assumptions under which our results hold.
3.1 Consistency
Our first result establishes that θˆ is a (strongly) consistent estimator for θ0. Moreover this is the
case even if one uses the optimal bandwidths for estimating G0(·|·) and g0(·|·) in the first step,
i.e. the bandwidths proposed by Stone (1982). To see this, we notice that the “optimal one-step”
bandwidths satisfy our assumption A4 above (with d = 1) since they are of the form,
hG = λG
(
logL
L
)1/(2R+3)
; h1g = λ1g
(
logL
L
)1/(2R+1)
; h2g = λ2g
(
logL
L
)1/(2R+1)
,
where λG, λ1g and λ2g are strictly positive constants. As observed by GPV (2000), hG, h1g and
h2g, as given above are optimal bandwidth choices to estimate G0(·|·) and g0(·|·) given Proposition
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1 and A2-(iii) in that paper.6 Thus, A4 implies that our consistency result can be established when
using LPE in the first stage that converge at the best possible rate.
Assumption A5:
(i) The parameter space Θ ⊂ Rp is compact and θ0 is in the interior of Θ,
(ii) Identifying assumption: E[m(V,Z; θ)] = 0 if and only if θ = θ0,
(iii) sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)‖ − E ‖m(V,Z; θ)‖
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = oas(1),
(iv) m(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in V – there exists a measurable function K1(Z),E[K1] <∞ such that
∀V, V ′ ∈ [V , V ],∀θ ∈ Θ, ∥∥m(V,Z; θ)−m(V ′, Z; θ)∥∥ ≤ K1(Z) ∣∣V − V ′∣∣ .
Let mk(·, ·) be the partial derivative of m(·, ·) with respect to its kth argument.
Assumption A6:
(i) m3(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in V : there exists a measurable function K3(Z),E[K3] <∞, such that
∀V, V ′ ∈ [V , V ],∀θ ∈ Θ, ∥∥m3(V,Z; θ)−m3(V ′, Z; θ)∥∥ ≤ K3(Z)|V − V ′|.
(ii) m3(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in θ: there exists a measurable function K4(Z),E[K4] <∞ such that
∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, V ∈ [V , V ], ∥∥m3(V,Z; θ)−m3(V,Z; θ′)∥∥ ≤ K4(Z)∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ .
(iii) sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)− E[m3(V,Z; θ)]
∥∥∥∥∥∥ = oas(1) and E[m′3(V,Z; θ)]ΩE[m3(V,Z; θ)]
is non singular.
(iv) sup
θ∈Θ
‖m3(V,Z; θ)‖ ≤ K5(V,Z) with E[K5(V,Z)] <∞,
6As pointed out before, A2-(iii) in our case is stronger than A2-(iii) in GPV (2000). Thus their Proposition 1 also
holds in our framework.
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(v) m1(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in V : there exists a measurable function K6(Z),E[K6] <∞ such that
∀V, V ′ ∈ [V , V ], θ ∈ Θ, ∥∥m1(V,Z; θ)−m1(V ′, Z; θ)∥∥ ≤ K6(Z)|V − V ′|.
(vi) sup
θ∈Θ
‖m1(V,Z; θ)‖ ≤ K7(V,Z) with E[K7(V,Z)2] <∞.
(vii) E[m1(V,Z; θ0)] <∞, where the expectation is with respect to the joint cdf of (V,Z).
Assumptions 5 and 6 are implied by the regularity conditions used in GMM estimators, (see
Newey and McFadden, 1994). These regularity conditions impose appropriate differentiability re-
strictions on the moment functions, which rule out certain kinds of moment conditions. For instance
these assumptions rule out moment conditions that define quantiles. Let ρτ (s) =| s | +(2τ − 1)
where τ ∈ (0, 1). Then the conditional and unconditional moment conditions, Koenker (2005), in
this case are respectively given by
E[ρ(V,Z; θ0(τ))] = E[| V − Z ′θ0(τ) | +(2τ − 1)] = 0,
E[Zρ(V,Z; θ0(τ))] = E[Z(| V − Z ′θ0(τ) | +(2τ − 1))].
and the corresponding sample moment condition is
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
Zℓ(| Vpℓ − Z ′ℓθ(τ) | +(2τ − 1)).
Since a function |s| is not everywhere differentiable, our method does not apply because we use
Taylor’s series expansion.7 Now, we show that the estimator is consistent.
Proposition 1. Let θˆ be defined as in (10). Then, under A1-A5 θˆ
a.s−→ θ0.
The proof is in the Appendix. This is the first step in order to be able to establish the asymptotic
7One can, however, use results from empirical processes to allow for non-smooth moment conditions. Typically
those conditions impose sufficient differentiability of the distribution function F (·|·; ·) and stochastic equicontinuity.
Since one of the arguments of the moment conditions is estimated nonparametrically, verifying stochastic equiconti-
nuity in our framework can be difficult. We want to thank one of the referees for this observation.
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distribution of the estimator. Moreover, there is no need to under-smooth the distribution and
density functions in the first step in order for θˆ to be consistent.
3.2 Asymptotic Normality
Given that θˆ is a (strongly) consistent estimator for θ0, in Proposition 2 we establish its asymptotic
distribution and its uniform convergence rate, under some additional regularity conditions. Since
optimal bandwidth choice requires under-smoothing in semiparametric procedures we have to modify
our choice of bandwidths.8 Thus, for θˆ to achieve the parametric uniform rate of convergence we
need to specify bandwidths for our first step that rule out the optimal choice and moreover that
imply under-smoothed estimates for Gˆ(·|·) and gˆ(·|·), as is made clear by A4.AN below.
Assumption A4.AN: The bandwidths hG, h1g and h2g satisfy
(i)
√
LhR+1G → 0 and
logL√
LhG
→ 0, as L→∞,
(ii)
√
LhR1g → 0,
√
LhR2g → 0 and
logL√
Lh1gh2g
→ 0, as L→∞,
(iii) h1g = h2g.
The assumption that h1g and h2g vanish at the same rate, is to simplify the notation in the proof. In
fact it is enough to choose any pair of bandwidths strictly smaller than their optimal counterparts.9
Proposition 2. Let θˆ be defined as in (10). Then, under A1-A3, A4.AN and A5-A6, we have
√
L(θˆ − θ0) d−→ N (0,Σ),
8Another typical property usually encountered has to do with a sufficiently large degree of smoothness relative to
the dimension of the exogenous variables, as reflected by A2-(iii).
9For the multivariate case (d > 1), these conditions become:
(i)
√
LhR+dG → 0 and
logL√
LhdG
→ 0, as L→∞.
(ii)
√
LhR+d−11g → 0,
√
LhR2g → 0 and logL√
Lhd1gh2g
→ 0, as L→∞.
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where for each I ∈ I,Σ = Var(ψ1), with
ψ1 = −1/I
I∑
p=1
{
(CTΩC)−1CΩm(Vp1,X1, I; θ0) + 2
[∑
I
1
I(I − 1)N(Yp1, I)
f−1m (X1, I)g0(Yp1, I)− E
[∑
I
1
I(I − 1)N(Yp1, I)f
−1
m (X1, I)g0(Yp1, I)
]]}
,
C = E[∂m(V,X, I; θ0)/∂θ], Ypℓ ≡ (Bpℓ,Xℓ)
N(Yp1, I) = [m1(Vp1,X1, I; θ0)/g0(Bp1|X1, I)2]G0(Bp1|X1, I).
Proposition 2 is important for several reasons. First it establishes that our semiparametric estimator
has a standard limiting distribution. Asymptotic Normality is fundamental since most of the econo-
metric tests rely on it. Second, although slow estimators are used in the first step of our estimation
procedure to recover pseudo private values, the estimator of the parameter of interest converges at
the best possible rate. Third, our semiparametric estimator is not subject to the curse of dimen-
sionality. Finally, Proposition 2 can be used to conduct inference on θ0. There are already some
empirical papers in the literature that fit in our framework. For example, Krasnokutskaya and Seim
(2011); Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) estimate auction models using semiparametric or fully para-
metric procedure, and if we ignore the unobserved heterogeneity, both these papers satisfy all our
assumptions.
We conclude this section with few points about our procedure, especially that of the LPE,
that deserve mention. First, LPE regression is more computationally complex than the standard
least squares method, because a model must be fit for each observed data point. With “brute
force” methods, it would take approximately L × Iℓ times longer to fit a local linear regression
than it would take to fit a “global” linear regression; see Seifert, Brockmann, Engel, and Gasser
(1994). This is without factoring all the calculations that go in kernel evaluations and choosing
bandwidths. Many methods for choosing the bandwidth h rely on cross-validation, Fan and Gijbels
(1995); Prewitt and Lohr (2006). This necessitates solving the LPE minimization repeatedly. The
complexity multiplies as d increases, for then we need higher degree polynomial which are difficult
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to evaluate. So care must be given to using a “quicker” method for solving the minimization.
Fan and Marron (1994); Hall and Wand (1996) propose to use “updating” and linear “binning” for
this purpose.10
Second since in the equilibrium, and as mentioned in the introduction, G(b|Z) ≡ F (s−1(b; θ0, Z)|Z),
the parameter of interest θ0 enters the moment conditions directly and indirectly through the
first stage nonparametric estimate of ψ(·). This makes our estimation procedure different from
the widely studied semiparametric method, for example Chamberlain (1992), where the parame-
ter of interest does not enter the nuisance (nonparametric) first stage estimate, and as a result
we lose some efficiency. Had the first-step also been parametric then for a candidate θ the nui-
sance function would be calculated and then in the minimization step, θ would enter the mo-
ment conditions twice. With nonparametric first-step, however, we did not have to fix θ, but
at a cost of higher variance or lower efficiency.11 But determining the exact loss of efficiency
would require us to determine semiparametric efficiency for the non-regular case which is consid-
ered to be a hard problem, Ibragimov and Has’minskii (1981); Newey (1990); Chamberlain (1992);
Bickel, Klaassen, Ritov, and Wellner (1993), and is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Monte Carlo Experiments
Now, we want to see the performance of the estimator we proposed through two sets of Monte Carlo
exercises. In the first set, we consider one dimensional auction characteristics, i.e., d = 1 and in the
second set we consider d = 2. For both cases we fix number of bidders Iℓ = 5 for all ℓ = 1, . . . , L,
where L = 200 when d = 1 but when d = 2, we let L to be either 200, 100 or 50.
We use two yardsticks to evaluate the performance of our estimator. The first is the visual
method where we present the estimated density using our procedure, and to facilitate comparison
we also present the true density along with the estimated density that uses GPV (2000) method.
The second method is to compare the optimal ex-ante expected revenue for the seller. To compute
10All of these methods are now easily implemented using statistical programming language like R.
11We owe this obsevration to one of the referees.
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the revenue we first use the plug-in method to choose the optimal reserve price, r = 1−Fˆ (r)
fˆ(r)
, Myerson
(1981) and then calculate the corresponding (maximized) expected revenue Krishna (2002)
Π(r) = I
[
r(1− Fˆ )(Fˆ (r))I−1 +
∫ v
r
(1− Fˆ (t))t(I − 1)(Fˆ (t))(I−2)fˆ(t)dt
]
. (11)
Like with the figures, we calculate the revenue corresponding to our semiparametric estimate, GPV
(2000) estimate and the true density. Since the final goal of estimating the value density is to
choose optimal auction, comparing revenues across different estimators is a good way to judge the
performance of the estimators – the closer the revenue to the truth the better the estimates. We
present all of these results while fixing X at its median value and find that our estimator performs
well according to both measures.
4.1 One Dimensional Covariate
Let X ∼ lnN (0, 1) truncated at 0.055 and 30 to satisfy A2-(i), and V |X ∼ F (·|Z; θ0, γ0) =
lnN (1+X, 1) truncated at 0.055 and 30, so θ0 = (1, 1)T and γ0 = {∅}. While estimating, we assume
that R = 3. In line with assumption A3, we choose the triweight kernel (35/32)(1 − u2)31(|u| ≤ 1)
for the three kernels involved in our first step estimators. We choose the bandwidths according
to A4.AN. In particular we use hG = 2.978 × 1.06σˆx(IL)−1/6.5, h1g = 2.978 × 1.06σˆx(IL)−1/4.5,
h2g = 2.978× 1.06σˆb(IL)−1/4.5, where σˆb and σˆx are the estimated standard deviations of observed
bids and object heterogeneity, respectively. The factor 2.978 × 1.06 follows from the so-called rule
of thumb (see Härdle, 1991). The use of I arises because we have I bidders per auction.
To replicate the GPV (2000) estimator we choose the bandwidths according to the optimal rates.
Thus, the order of the bandwidths is L−1/9 for hG and the second step bandwidth hx and L
−1/10 for
hgb and hgx and the second step bandwidths hfv and hfx. Specifically we use hG = 1.06σˆx(IL)
−1/9,
hgx = 1.06σˆx(IL)
−1/10, hgb = 1.06σˆb(IL)
−1/10 where σˆb and σˆx are as defined above. The second
step bandwidths are hfv = 1.06σˆvˆ(nt)
−1/10, hfx = 1.06σˆx(nt)
−1/10 and hx = 1.06σˆx(L)
−1/9, where
nt is the number of observations remaining after trimming. See Table 1 for all the bandwidths.
12
12For GPV(2000) we also need to compute the boundary bandwidths.
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Notation Constant Rate
LPE
hG 2.978 × 1.06 × σˆx (IL)−1/6.5
h1g 2.978 × 1.06 × σˆx (IL)1/4.5
h2g 2.978 × 1.06 × σˆb (IL)−1/4.5
GPV 1st step
hG 1.06 × σˆx (IL)−1/9
hgb 1.06× σˆb (IL)−1/10
hgx 1.06 × σˆx (IL)−1/10
GPV 2nd step
hfvˆ 1.06 × σvˆ n−1/10t
hfx 1.06 × σˆx n−1/10t
hx 1.06 × σˆx L−1/9
Boundary hδ λδ > 0 n
−1/2
Table 1: Bandwidths when d=1.
We use 1000 replications for estimation where in each replication we: (i) generate randomly IL
private values using the truncated normal distribution; (ii) compute the corresponding bids Bpℓ
using (2); (iii) use these bids to estimate the distribution and density functions using (4) and (5);
(iii) determine the pseudo private values Vˆpℓ corresponding to Bpℓ; (iv) use this sample of pseudo
private values to obtain θˆ using the sample moment condition
1
IL
L∑
ℓ=1
I∑
p=1
∇θ ln f(Vˆpℓ|I,X; θ) = 0. (12)
We now quickly verify that this data generating process satisfies Assumptions A1 – A6. It is
immediate to verify that Assumption A1–A4 are satisfied because of the way we have designed the
experiment. In our estimation we will restrict our attention at finding parameters from a compact
set, and since log-likelihood is concave and smooth Assumption A5 (i)–(iii) are satisfied. Although
we do not show the derivation, we can use the mean-value theorem to bound the slope of the moment
conditions with respect to V . This slope is highest but bounded when V = 0.055, which satisfies
A5 (iv). Although tedious, we can still use the mean-value theorem to verify A6 (i), (ii) and (v).
Again, the first part of A6 (iii) follows from the regularity conditions and the law of large numbers,
the second part and the rest of A6 are satisfied by design.
We present our estimator (labeled SP) along with GPV (2000) estimated density and the true
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Figure 1: Valuation Densities. TRUE refers to the true density, while SP and GPV refer to
the semiparametric and GPV(2000) estimators, respectively. The vertical lines correspond to the
trimming that is required only for the GPV estimator.
density, all evaluated at the median X in Figure 1. As is evident, our estimator is very close to the
true density suggesting that it performs reasonably well. Next, we calculate the expected revenue
given in (11) with v = 30. The true expected revenue is ΠTrue = 5.9 and the revenue using our
estimate gives ΠSP = 5.8 while using GPV gives ΠGPV = 4.6, which means our estimate is much
closer to the true value.
4.2 Two Dimensional Covariate
Let X = (X1,X2)
T ∼ logN



 1
1

 ,

 1 0.8
0.8 1



, and V |X ∼ logN (µv(X), σ2v(X)), both
truncated at 0.055 and 30. As before we fix I = 5 bidders in all auctions, but consider three
different specifications for (µv(X), σ
2
v(X)): (i) (1 +X1/X2, 1); (ii) (1 +X1 +X2, 1); and (iii) (1 +
X1/X2, exp(0.01(X1 +X2))). To compare the performance of our estimator we use simulated data
from L = 200, 100, 50 auctions.
In line with the assumption A3, we choose the products of tri-weight kernel (35/32)(1 −
19
Symbol Constant Rate
LPE
hGj 2.978 × 1.06 × σˆxj (IL)−1/8.5
h1gj 2.978 × 1.06 × σˆxj (IL)1/9.5
h2g 2.978 × 1.06 × σˆb (IL)−1/9.5
GPV 1st step
hGj 1.06 × σˆxj (IL)−1/12
hgb 1.06 × σˆb (IL)−1/13
hgxj 1.06 × σˆxj (IL)−1/13
GPV 2nd step
hfvˆ 1.06 × σvˆ n−1/13t
hfxj 1.06 × σˆxj n−1/13t
hxj 1.06 × σˆxj L−1/12
Boundary hδ λδ > 0 n
−1/3
Table 2: Bandwidths when d=2.
u2)31(|u| ≤ 1) in our first-step. Like before, we choose two bandwidths, one for each covariate,
according to A4.AN, while ensuring under smoothing when compared to GPV estimator. To repli-
cate the GPV (2000) estimator we choose the bandwidths according to the optimal rates. Thus,
the order of the bandwidths is L−1/12 for hG and the second step bandwidth hxj and L
−1/13 for hgb
and hgxj and the second step bandwidths hfv and hfxj , for j = 1, 2, see Table 2.
We follow exactly the same steps as with d = 1 to estimate the parameters, except that now
we have three different sample sizes, n = L× I ∈ {250, 500, 1000} and three different specifications
for mean and variance, and we use Θ = [0.055, 30] × [0.001, 2]. In total, there are 9 different cases,
and hence 9 different densities. Figure 2 below shows the true density of private values against our
estimator (the dashed line) and the GPV estimator (the dotted line). As can be seen in Figure
2 our estimator performs really well, even when there are only 50 auctions, while GPV (2000) is
infeasible because after trimming we had very few observations left. The estimated revenues for
each density is presented in Table 3. And as before, our estimator still performs relatively well.
(µ(X), σ2(X)) 1 2 3
Profit\ L 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
ΠTrue 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.7 6.9 7.0 7.0
ΠSP 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.4 5.5 5.5 6.6 6.5 6.5
ΠGPV 4.2 3.6 – 4.8 2.9 – 4.6 4.0 –
Table 3: Optimal Revenue: Each column corresponds to the three sets of mean and variance, and each cell
contains the optimal revenue as defined in (11), one for each density in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Valuation Densities. TRUE refers to the true density, while SP and GPV refer to the semiparmaetric and GPV(2000) estimators,
respectively. Each row refers to a different DGP while each column refers to different number of auctions.
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5 Extensions
In this Section we indicate how to extend our procedure to a more general class of auction models.
5.1 Binding Reserve Price
The first natural extension of the model considered in Section 2 is the symmetric IPV first-price
auction model with a binding reserve price, announced or random.
5.1.1 Announced Reserve Price
An announced binding reserve price (r0 > V ) constitutes a screening device for participating in the
auction. As pointed out by GPV (2000) the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy is still given by (2)
in this set up, but the number I of potential bidders becomes unobserved and typically different
from the observed number, I∗, of actual bidders who have submitted a bid (≥ r0). Hence the model
has a new structural element, namely I, in addition to the latent distribution of bidders’ private
values. As shown in GPV (2000), the differential equation defining the equilibrium strategy can be
rewritten as
Vp = ξ0(Bp, G
∗
0, F (r0), I) = Bp +
1
I − 1
(
G∗0(Bp)
g∗0(Bp)
+
F (r0)
1− F (r0)
1
g∗0(Bp)
)
,
for p = 1, . . . , I∗ and where G∗0(·) is the truncated distribution of an observed bid conditional upon
the fact that the corresponding private value is grater than or equal to r0. Provided one can estimate
I and F (r0) this equation is the basis for a two step procedure analogous to that of Section 2. In
particular, for ℓ = 1 . . . , L and p = 1 . . . , I if Bpℓ ≥ r0ℓ the above equation becomes
Vpℓ = Bpℓ +
1
Iℓ − 1
(
G∗0(Bpℓ|Iℓ, Zℓ, θ0)
g∗0(Bpℓ|Iℓ, Zℓ, θ0)
+
F (r0|Zℓ, θ0))
1− F (r0|Iℓ, Zℓ, θ0))
1
g∗0(Bpℓ|Iℓ, Zℓ, θ0))
)
,
where Zℓ = (r0ℓ,Xℓ) and θ0 is the unknown true parameter vector. Let h(·|Xℓ, γ0) be the probability
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mass function of the number of potential bidders, Iℓ, which is known up to a finite parameter γ0.
At the ℓ-th auction, a potential bidder p will bid if an only if his private valuation is above the
reserve price. Thus, at this auction, the number of actual bidders is I∗ℓ = 1/Iℓ
∑Iℓ
p=1 1(Vpℓ ≥ r0ℓ),
which is a binomial random variable with parameters (Iℓ, 1 − F (r0ℓ|Xℓ, θ0)). In view of these, we
propose to use the following moment conditions for bids and the observed number of bidders
E[Vpℓ|Vpℓ ≥ ξ0(r0ℓ),Xℓ; γ] =
∑
Iℓ≥2
m(Iℓ, r0ℓ,Xℓ; θ0)h(Iℓ|Xℓ; γ),
E[I∗ℓ |Iℓ, Zℓ] =
∑
Iℓ≥2
Iℓ[1− F (r0ℓ|Xℓ; θ)]h(Iℓ|Xℓ; γ),
E[I∗2ℓ |Iℓ, Zℓ] =
∑
Iℓ≥2
[1− F (r0ℓ|Xℓ; θ)][F (r0ℓ|Xℓ; θ) + Iℓ(1− F (r0ℓ|Xℓ; θ))],
where the moment function m(·, ·, ·; ·) can be similar to the ones in (8).13
5.1.2 Random Reserve Price
In some cases, as in timber and wine auctions, the seller may decide not to announce the reserve
price at the time the auction takes place. Hence, the reserve price is said to be secret or random.
Since bidders do not know it when submitting their bids, this fact brings into the model a new
kind of uncertainty that has to be taken into account. To present the basic equation underlying
our two-step procedure in this model we need first to introduce additional notation. To keep the
notation as simple as possible we consider models without observed object heterogeneity. This is
not restrictive since relaxing this assumption implies that the distribution and density functions
have to be replaced by their conditional counterparts.
Let V0 be the private value of the risk-neutral seller for the auctioned object. Moreover, we
assume that V0 is distributed according to H(·) defined on the same support as F (·) and that H(·)
is common knowledge. Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel, and Vuong (1994) have shown that in a first-
price sealed bid auction r0 = V0. In addition the bidders’ equilibrium strategy is the solution of
a differential equation which in general cannot be solved explicitly. See Li and Perrigne (2003).
13We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to give the moment conditions for this model.
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However, this differential equation can be rewritten as follows
Vp = ξ0(Bp,H,G0, I) = Bp +
1
(I − 1)
(
g0(Bp)
G0(Bp)
+
h(Bp)
H(Bp)
) ,
for p = 1, . . . , I. As mentioned by Perrigne and Vuong (1999) since the reserve price is kept secret,
all potential bidders submit a bid. Hence I is typically observed. The above equation can be used
as the basis of a two-step procedure similar to the one described in Section 2. Namely, in a first
step observed bids and reserve prices can be used to estimate nonparametrically the distribution
G0(·), its density g0(·) as well as the distribution H(·) and its density h(·). Next, pseudo private
values can be recovered using the equation above in order to define a set of moment conditions for
estimating the parameter of interest θ0 in a second step.
We conclude this part by noting that because of the revenue equivalence principle, Myerson
(1981); Riley and Samuelson (1981), our method is also useful to study other standard auctions
such as third-price auctions, Kagel and Levin (1993), all-pay auctions.14
5.2 The Symmetric Affiliated Private Value (APV) Model
To assume independence across private value can be restrictive since one can expect some degree
of affiliation or positive correlation among private values. Thus, another natural extension of our
framework is to consider the more general class of model encompassed by symmetric APV models.
Affiliation means that if one bidder draws a high valuation for the auctioned object, then others
bidders are likely to draw higher valuations too. Laffont and Vuong (1996) study the problem of
identification and theoretical restrictions in a general framework, namely in Affiliated Value (AV)
models. In particular they show that any symmetric AV model is observationally equivalent to
some symmetric APV model because the utility function is not identified from observed bids only.
Therefore when only data on observed bids are available, the result in Laffont and Vuong (1996)
implies that APV models can be considered, provided that we have identification.
14We thank one of the referees for the suggestion. These results are available upon request.
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We briefly indicate here how to adapt our estimation procedure to this kind of models, when
all bids are observed and the reserve price is non-binding. Let Yp = maxp′ 6=p Vj . The differential
equation defining the equilibrium strategy in the APV model can be written as follows
Vp = ξ0(Bp, G0) ≡ Bp +
G0,B1|B1(Bp|Bp)
g0,B1|B1(Bp|Bp)
,
subject to the boundary condition s(V ) = V , where G0,B1|B1(X1|X1) = FY1|V1(s−1(X1)), B1 =
s0(Y1). The index “1” refers to any bidder since bidder are assumed to be ex-ante symmet-
ric.This equation is again the basis for the identification result and estimation procedure. See
Perrigne and Vuong (1999) for details. The theoretical restrictions as shown by Li, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2002) indicate that the joint distribution of bids G0(·) can be rationalized by a symmetric APV
model if and only if (i) G0(·) is symmetric and affiliated and (ii) the function ξ0(·, G0) is strictly
increasing on its support. Moreover, if these two conditions are satisfied, then the joint distribution
F (·) of private values is identified. In view of their results, Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002) propose
a two step fully nonparametric procedure in the same sprite as GPV(2000). Nevertheless, for the
affiliated model the procedure has to be performed for each size I (i.e. for each given number of bid-
ders). Regarding estimation, the equation above suggests a two-step procedure analogous to the one
described in Section 2 for each size I of bidders. In the first step the ratio GB1|B1(·|·)/gB1 |B1(·|·) can
be estimated nonparametrically and then pseudo private values can be recovered. In the second step
a GMM procedure can be implemented to estimate the parameters of the underlying distribution of
private values for a given I. It is known that with affiliation, the rate of convergence is slower than
with independence; this follows from Proposition 2 in Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002). In particular
this Proposition gives explicit forms for the bandwidths that can be used in our framework since
these choices satisfy our assumption A4.AN.15
15They consider homogenous auctions; see footnote 10 in Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002).
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5.3 Asymmetric Models
Assuming that bidders are ex ante identical may constitute a limitation, and in some cases one
needs to relax this assumption. Asymmetric auction models, however, lead to systems of differential
equations without a closed form solution. Hence, the direct approach becomes extremely difficult
to implement. Nevertheless, using our indirect procedure, parameters can be structurally estimated
without solving for the equilibrium strategy or its inverse.
5.3.1 The Asymmetric IPV Model
Following the exposition in Perrigne and Vuong (2008) we assume that asymmetry is ex ante
known to all bidders. Let F1(·), . . . , FI(·) be the private value distributions of the I bidders
whose identities are observed and let G01(·), . . . , G0I(·) be the corresponding bid distributions;
see Flambard and Perrigne (2006). We can then express the system of differential equations as
Vp = Bp +
1∑
p′ 6=p
g0p′ (Bp)
G0p′ (Bp)
, p, p′ = 1, . . . , I,
which lead, naturally to a two-step procedure, similar as before.
5.3.2 The Asymmetric APV Model
For simplicity we consider only two types of bidders. That is, the model assumes that the I-
dimensional vector (V11, . . . , V1I1 , V21, . . . , V2I2) is distributed jointly as F (·) which is exchangeable
in its first I1 and last I2 arguments. We can interpret this structure as follows. There is symmetry
within each subgroup, and since F (·) is affiliated, there is general positive dependence among
private values. Perrigne and Vuong (1999) show that type specific equilibrium bidding strategies
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are characterized as the solution of the following system of differential equation,
V1p = ξ1(B1p, G0) ≡ B1p +
G0B∗
1
,B0|B1(B1p, B1p|B1p)
∂G0B∗
1p ,B0|B1
(B1p, B1p|B1p)/∂(B∗1 , B2)
, p = 1, 2, . . . , I1
V2p = ξ0(B2p, G0) ≡ B2p +
G0B1,B∗2 |B2(B2p, B2p|B2p)
∂G0B1,B∗2 |B2(B2p, B2p|B2p)/∂(B1, B∗2)
, p = 1, 2, . . . , I2,
where B∗t = maxp 6=1,p∈It Btp, Bt = maxp∈It Btp, for t = 1, 2. Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003)
show that this identifies F (·, . . . , ·), and use a nonparametric two-step procedure to estimate the
model. Similar to above, the two-step semiparametric procedure would involve using the above
system of equations to recover the pseudo private values after obtaining nonparametric estimates
for G0B∗
1
,B2|B1(·, ·|·) and G0B1,B∗2 |B2(·, ·|·), and then estimating the parameters of θ through a set of
moment conditions. As Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003) have shown, the choice of bandwidths
for asymmetric APV is similar to bandwidths for symmetric case, like Li, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2002). Which means we can follow the same steps as in symmetric APV to choose our bandwidths.
5.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In some auctions it is possible that even after conditioning on auction covariates Zℓ, the bids are
still correlated. Other than affiliation, such correlation could be a result of an auction characteristic
Uℓ ∈ R++ that is missing in the data, but is observed by the bidders. Such auctions are known as
auctions with unobserved heterogeneity. In this subsection, we propose one possible way to adapt
our semiparametric procedure to auctions with multiplicative unobserved heterogeneity as studied
by Krasnokutskaya (2011). As it will be clear later, in this case the rate of convergence and the
asymptotic variance derived in our Proposition 2 will not be applicable. But determining the exact
asymptotic properties is beyond the scope of this paper. We begin by introducing new and relevant
notations and assumptions.
Assumption A8:
(i) Let Vpℓ = V˜pℓ × Uℓ be bidder p’s value in ℓth auction such that Uℓ ⊥ V˜pℓ and Uℓ ⊥ Zℓ.
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(ii) Given Z the random variables Vpℓ, V˜pℓ are independently and identically distributed as F (·|Z)
and F˜ (·|Z), respectively.
(iiii) Uℓ is independently and identically distributed as FU (·) across auctions with E(ln(U)) = 0.
In summary, Uℓ is independent across auctions, and in every auction with covariates Zℓ each bidder
draws his/her “true value” V˜pℓ from F˜ (·|Zℓ) and bids according to Vpℓ. Let s(·|Zℓ, Uℓ) denote
the bidding strategy when the observed and unobserved covariates are, Zℓ and Uℓ, respectively,
and let s˜(·|Zℓ) = s(·|Zℓ, Uℓ = 1) be the bidding strategy when the Uℓ = 1, i.e., without unobserved
heterogeneity. Krasnokutskaya (2011) shows that under Assumption A8: s(Vpℓ|Zℓ, Uℓ) = s˜(V˜pℓ|Zℓ)×
Uℓ so that the bids satisfy Bpℓ = B˜pℓ × Uℓ, where B˜pℓ is the bid by bidder p in auction ℓ when
Uℓ = 1. If we use G0(·|Z,U) and G˜0(·|Z) to denote the conditional distribution of B given (Z,U)
and the conditional distribution of B˜ given Z, respectively, then Bpℓ = B˜pℓ × Uℓ implies
G˜0(b|Z) = Pr(B˜ ≤ b|Z) = Pr(B ≤ b× U |Z,U) = G0(b× U |Z,U);
g˜0(b|Z) = g0(b× U |Z,U) × U.
To simplify notation we suppress Z, and everything is to be understood as conditional on Z, unless
stated otherwise. The first step is to identify FU (·). For auction ℓ = 1, . . . , L select any two bids and
call them (B1ℓ, B2ℓ), and let F(lnB1,lnB2)(·, ·) be the joint characteristic function of (lnB1, lnB2).
Then under a normalization E[ln B˜1] = 0, Krasnokutskaya (2011) shows that we can use Kotlarski
(1966) to identify the characteristic function of lnU as
FlnU (t) = exp
(∫ t
0
∂F(lnB1,lnB2)(0, c)/∂ lnB1
F(lnB1,lnB2)(0, c)
dc
)
,
which identifies FlnU (·) as the Fourier inverse of FlnU (t). So for the remainder we treat FU (·) as
known. The second step consists on estimating G˜0(·) and g˜0(·) of B˜ from:
lnBpℓ = ln B˜pℓ + lnUℓ, p = 1, . . . , Iℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L.
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Since lnUℓ is unobserved, the estimators defined in (4) and (5) are infeasible. We can, however,
replace the unobserved (ln B˜j − b)ρKh(ln B˜j − b) in (4) and (5) with (lnBj − b)ρK˜h(lnBj − b),
Fan and Truong (1993); Delaigle, Fan, and Carroll (2009), where K˜h(b) = h
−1K˜(b/h), and satisfies
E
{
(lnBj − b)ρK˜h(lnBj − b)| ln B˜j
}
= (ln B˜j − b)ρKh(ln B˜ − b), ρ = 0, 1.
Delaigle, Fan, and Carroll (2009) propose using the Fourier transformation of the above equation
to determine K˜h(·), and show that the presence of Uℓ only affect the variance of the estimator.16
This gives us the estimates of the distribution and density of B˜. Even though we cannot recover
ln B˜pℓ, from lnBpℓ, we simulate the former from G˜0(·|Zℓ) and determine
V˜ ιpℓ = B˜
ι
pℓ +
1
Iℓ − 1
G˜0(B˜
ι
pℓ|Zℓ)
g˜0(B˜ιpℓ|Zℓ)
, p = 1, . . . , Iℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, ι = 1, . . . ,S,
where S is large. Then in the third-step we estimate θˆ using the appropriate empirical moment
conditions:
1
S
S∑
ι=1
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
m(V˜ ιpℓ, Zℓ; θ) ≈ 0.
We conjecture that the estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal. Since the rate of conver-
gence of the estimator in the first step depends heavily on the smoothness of fU(·) – the smoother
the density, the slower the convergence Fan (1991) – and because the error in steps 1 and 2 affect the
asymptotic variance of θˆ, Proposition 2 does not apply here. Full characterization of the asymptotic
properties of θˆ needs careful consideration and is left for future research.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we develop an indirect procedure to estimate first-price sealed-bid auction models,
contributing in this way to the structural analysis of auction data that has been developed in
16The final result also depends on the smoothness of the density of the unobserved heterogeneity, see
Delaigle, Hall, and Meister (2008); Delaigle, Fan, and Carroll (2009).
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the last fifteen years. Following GPV (2000) our procedure is in two steps. The difference with
GPV (2000) is that our second step is implemented using a GMM procedure so that our resulting
model is semiparametric. We show that our semiparametric estimator converges uniformly at the
parametric
√
L rate while the nonparametric estimator in GPV (2000) was shown to converge at
the best possible rate according to the minimax theory which is slower than the parametric rate.
Moreover, our procedure is not subject to the so-called curse of dimensionality or in other words
the convergence rate is independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables. We establish
consistency and asymptotic normality of our estimator.
Given the nature of our procedure it is not necessary to solve explicitly for the equilibrium
strategy or its inverse. This is a valuable advantage with respect to direct methods specially when
estimating models that lead to intractable first-order conditions, such as asymmetric auction models.
More generally, our method extends to models which have been estimated using a nonparametric
indirect procedure. In this respect, we briefly outline how this can be done in models with a binding
reserve price (announced or random), affiliated private value models and asymmetric models.
Finally, we conducted a set of Monte Carlo simulations. The main purpose for this was to asses
the performance of our estimator in finite samples relative to the nonparametric estimator proposed
by GPV (2000). Our semiparametric estimator does a good job in matching the true density. When
comparing with the nonparametric GPV (2000) estimator, we can see that the estimator developed
in this paper is not subject to boundary effects. Moreover, using our estimator generates optimal
revenue that is closer to the revenue, if we had used the true density, than using GPV (2000)
estimator.
Since Krasnokutskaya (2011) unobserved auction heterogeneity has become important in empir-
ical auction – ignoring it can lead to serious misspecification error. Moreover, it is known that the
nonparmetric estimation is precarious, more so that the auctions without unobserved heterogeneity.
Although we touched on this subject in this paper, we believe that determining asymptotic and
efficiency properties of a semiparametric estimator is important. We hope our paper provides the
necessary impetus and motivation for someone to explore this problem.
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Appendix
Proofs of Asymptotic Properties
This Appendix gives the proofs of our asymptotic results (Propositions 1 and 2). First, we present two
important results.
Results: Under A4 we have,
(i) sup
(b,x,I)
|gˆ(b|x, I)− g0(b|x, I)| = Oas
(
hR1g + h
R
2g +
√
logL
Lh1gh2g
)
(ii) sup
(b,x,I)
∣∣∣Gˆ(b|x, I)−G0(b|x, I)∣∣∣ = Oas
(
hR+1G +
√
logL
LhG
)
For a proof of the above results we refer the reader to Korostelev and Tsybakov (1993). We observe
that the above results imply that sup
pℓ
|Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ| = oas(1).
Proposition 1
Proof. It suffices to show that sup
θ∈Θ
‖ SL(θ)− SˆL(θ) ‖ = oas(1). From the triangle inequality, A5-(iv) it
follows that
sup
θ∈Θ
‖SL(θ)− SˆL(θ)‖ = sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)− 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
m(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ)
∥∥∥∥∥
= sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)−m(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ)]
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)−m(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ)∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K1(Zℓ)|Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ|
= {E[K1(Z)] + oas(1)} sup
pℓ
|Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ|
= oas(1) (A.1)
Where we use the fact that Vˆpℓ is a consistent estimator of Vpℓ, i.e. we make use of the 2 results stated at
the beginning of this Appendix. Therefore, the desired result follows.
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Proposition 2
Proof. Recall that θˆ is the feasible estimator while θ˜ is the infeasible estimator. We want to show:
√
L(θˆ − θ0) =
√
L(θ˜ − θ0)− L(L− 1)
L2
2√
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
{∑
I
1
I(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)
g0(Ypℓ, I) + E
[∑
I
1
I(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
]}
+ op(1)
= − 1√
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
{
(CTΩC)−1CΩm(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0) + 2
L(L− 1)
L2
∑
I
1
I(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
−E
[∑
I
1
I(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
]}
+ op(1),
where C = E [∂m(V,X, I; θ0)/∂θ] , Ypℓ ≡ (Bpℓ, Xℓ),Ω is the p.d weighting matrix and
N(Ypℓ, I) = [m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)/g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)2]G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I).
The terms inside {} in the second equality is the influence function.17 Once we have shown this asymptotic
linear representation the result follows from the Central Limit Theorem.
From the FOCs that characterize θ˜ and θˆ respectively, we have
1
2
∂QL
∂θ
(θ˜) =
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)ΩSL(θ˜) = 0 (A.2)
1
2
∂QˆL
∂θ
(θˆ) =
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)ΩSˆL(θˆ) = 0. (A.3)
17The idea behind that is the following observation. Suppose after a Taylor expansion, we have:{ √
n(θˆ − θ0) = 1√n
∑n
i=1
ψ(zi) + op(1)
E(ψ(z)) = 0, var(ψ(z)) <∞
where ψ(·) is the influence function, then the asymptotic variance is V = var(ψ(z)). An alternative method would
have been to follow Newey (1994) and use the path derivative approach.
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We can use a Taylor expansion around θ0 to obtain
SL(θ˜) = SL(θ0) +
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)(θ˜ − θ0) (A.4)
SˆL(θˆ) = SˆL(θ0) +
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
)(θˆ − θ0), (A.5)
where θ and θ
∗
are vectors between θ˜ and θ0, and θˆ and θ0, respectively. Thus using (A.4) in (A.2) we get
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
[
SL(θ0) +
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)(θ˜ − θ0)
]
=
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)ΩSL(θ0) +
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)(θ˜ − θ0) = 0.
Therefore, we have
√
L(θ˜ − θ0) = −
[
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)
]−1
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
√
LSL(θ0) = −A˜−1B˜
√
LSL(θ0). (**)
Similarly using (A.5) in (A.3) yields
√
L(θˆ − θ0) = −
[
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
)
]−1
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
√
LSˆL(θ0) = −Aˆ−1Bˆ
√
LSˆL(θ0).
Next, we show: (i) B˜ − Bˆ = oas(1) ( Step 1); (ii) A˜ − Aˆ = oas(1), which together with A6-(iii) imply
A˜−1 − Aˆ−1 = oas(1)(Step 2); and finally (iii)
√
L[SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)] = Op(1) (Step 3).
1 Step 1
We prove B˜ − Bˆ = oas(1). The term B˜ − Bˆ can be written as
B˜ − Bˆ = ∂S
T
L
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω− ∂Sˆ
T
L
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω =
(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)− ∂Sˆ
T
L
∂θ
(θˆ)
)
Ω
=
(
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
(
mT3 (Vpℓ, Zℓ, θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)
))
Ω.
It suffices to show that the norm of the term between brackets is oas(1) since Ω is a positive definite
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matrix. Namely
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
mT3 (Vpℓ, Zℓ, θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ))
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
(mT3 (Vpℓ, Zℓ, θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)) +mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ))
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
(mT3 (Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜))
]∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ))
∥∥∥∥∥
= C +D, (A.6)
where the last line follows from the triangle inequality. The term C in (A.6) is
C =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
(mT3 (Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜))
]∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
∥∥∥[mT3 (Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)]∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K3(Zℓ)|Vpℓ − Vˆpℓ| ≤ {E[K3(Z)] + oas(1)} sup
pℓ
|Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ| = oas(1),
where we use assumption A6-(i) and the fact that Vˆpℓ is uniformly consistent– these results are stated at the
beginning of this Appendix. We consider now the term D in (A.6):
D =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)
]∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
∥∥∥mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K4(Zℓ)‖θ˜ − θˆ‖ = {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)} × oas(1),
where we have used A6-(ii) and the fact that θ˜ and θˆ are consistent estimators for θ0.
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2 Step 2
We prove A˜− Aˆ = oas(1). The term A˜− Aˆ is
A˜− Aˆ =
(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)
)
−
(
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
)
)
=
[
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
(
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜) + oas(1)
)]
−
[
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
(
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ) + oas(1)
)]
=
(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜)
)
−
(
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ)
)
+ oas(1)
=
[(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)− ∂Sˆ
T
L
∂θ
(θˆ)
)
Ω
](
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜) +
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ)
)
. (A.7)
where the second equality comes from the following
∥∥∥∥∂SL∂θT (θ)− ∂SL∂θT (θ˜)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)−m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)‖
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K4(Zℓ)‖θ − θ˜‖ = {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)}oas(1) = oas(1),
where we use A6-(ii), the fact that θ˜ ≤ θ ≤ θ0 and that θ˜ a.s−→ θ0. Similarly we can show that
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
) =
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ) + oas(1),
since θˆ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ0 and θˆ a.s−→ θ0. Now, for the last line in (A.7) we observe that by Step 1, the first factor in
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(A.7) is oas(1) and the second factor can be expressed as follows
∥∥∥∥∥
(
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜) +
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ)
)∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜) +m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)]
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖[m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜) +m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)]‖ ≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ˜)‖ + 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)‖
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
‖m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)‖+ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)−m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0) +m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K5(Vpℓ, Zℓ) +
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θˆ)−m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖
+
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)−m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0) +m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖
≤ {E[K5(V, Z)] + oas(1)}+ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K4(Zℓ)‖θˆ − θ0‖
+
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)−m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖+ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖
≤ {E[K5(V, Z)] + oas(1)}+ {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)}oas(1) + 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K3(Zℓ)|Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ|
+
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
‖m3(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)‖
≤ {E[K5(V, Z)] + oas(1)}+ {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)}oas(1) + {E[K3(Z)] + oas(1)} sup
pℓ
|Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ|
+{E[K5(V, Z)] + oas(1)} = 2{E[K5(V, Z)] + oas(1)} <∞
where we use assumption A6-(ii),(iv),(v) and the two results stated at the beginning of this Appendix.
Therefore the second factor in the last line of (A.7) converges to a finite limit, and since the first factor is
oas(1) the desired result follows.
3 Step 3
The final step is to prove
√
L(SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)) = Op(1). Since this step is the longest and the most tedious,
to facilitate reading we divide this step further into two sub-steps: Step 3.1 and Step 3.2, and before we
provide the formal proof we give a detailed description of all the steps involved.
Let B =
√
L[SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)] = B1+B2. In Step 3.1 we show that B1 = Op(1)+ oas(1) and in Step 3.2
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we show B2 = oas(1), see Equation (B-19). Of these two, Step 3.1 is more involved, but we can break down
the proof into following steps:
B1 ≤ B11 +B12 (See Equation (B-2))
= B111 +B112 +B12 (See Equation (B-10))
≤ CD +B112 +B12 (∵ C <∞, D = op(1))
≤ o(1) +B1121 +B1122 +B12 (See Equation (B-13) and B1121 = op(1))
≤ o(1) + op(1) +A+B +B12 (See Equation (B-15) and B1122 = A+B)
≤ o(1) + op(1) +A1 −A2 +B +B12 (See Equation (B-16), A1 ≤ A11 +A12 and A11 and A12 are oas(1/
√
L))
≤ o(1) + op(1) + oas(1/
√
L)−A2 +B +B12 (∵ A2 ≤ A21 + A22 and A21 and A22 are oas(1/
√
L))
≤ o(1) + op(1) + oas(1/
√
L)− oas(1/
√
L) +B +B12 (∵ B2 = B121 ×B122)
≤ o(1) + op(1) + oas(1/
√
L)− oas(1/
√
L) +B +B121 +B122 (∵ B121 <∞, B122 = o(1)⇒ B12 = o(1))
≤ o(1) + op(1) + oas(1/
√
L)− oas(1/
√
L) +B + o(1) (∵ B = Op(1))
= o(1) + op(1) + oas(1/
√
L)− oas(1/
√
L) +Op(1) + o(1) (See equation (B-15)).
We formalize the proof below. First we prove that the term
√
L(SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)) is
B =
√
L(SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)) =
√
L
(
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)− 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
m(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)
)
=
√
L
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)−m(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)
]
= Op(1) + oas(1).
The above expression can be rewritten as
B = −
√
L
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ)
]
+
√
L
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)−m1(V ∗pℓ, Zℓ; θ0)
]
(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ)
= B1 +B2, (B-1)
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where the second equality comes from a Taylor expansion of order one and the following
m(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)−m(Vˆpℓ, Zℓ; θ0) = m1(V ∗pℓ, Zℓ; θ0)(Vpℓ − Vˆpℓ)
= m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ) +m1(V ∗pℓ, Zℓ; θ0)(Vpℓ − Vˆpℓ)−m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ)
= −m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ) + [m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)−m1(V ∗pℓ, Zℓ; θ0)](Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ).
Step 3.1
We consider B1 in (B-1) and moreover we observe that for each I we can write
‖B1‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
√
L
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥
√
L
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
1
I − 1
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) −
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
]∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥
√
L
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − I)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
{
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) −
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g20(Bpℓ|Xℓ,I)
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) + G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)− g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
]2
− 1
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
]
[gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)− g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)]
}∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
√
L
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − I)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) −
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g20(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
]∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
√
L
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − I)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
(
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) [gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)− g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)]
2
− 1
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
]
[
gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)− g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
])∥∥∥∥∥ = ‖B11‖+ ‖B12‖ (B-2)
where the third line uses the following identity:
a˜
b˜
− a
b
=
a˜− ab b˜
b
+
a
b
1
b˜b
[b˜− b]2 − 1
b˜b
[a˜− a][b˜− b].
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The term B11 can be written as
B11 =
√
L
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − I)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)

 Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)− G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ,I)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ,I) gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)


=
√
L(RL +
L(L− 1)
L2
UL) = B111 +B112, (B-3)
where
RL =
1
L2
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(0)1(Bpℓ ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg (0)K2g,hg(0)
]
,
UL =
1
L(L− 1)
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
L∑
{j:Ij=I,j 6=ℓ}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
I∑
q=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −Xℓ)1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)−
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg(Xj −Xℓ)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bpℓ)
]
.
To see how to obtain the last line in (B-10), we observe that the term within brackets in the first line of
(B-10) can be expressed as
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)− G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ,I)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ,I) gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) =
1
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)− G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) gˆ(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
]
=
1
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)[
1
LhG
L
nI
L∑
{j:Ij=I}
I∑
q=1
eT1
(
XTI,R+1W
G
x XI,R+1
LI
)−1
XR+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
Lh2g
L
nI
L∑
{j:Ij=I}
I∑
q=1
eT1
(
XTI,RW
g
xXI,R
nI
)−1
XR,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)]
=
1
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
1
L
L
nI
L∑
{j:Ij=I}
I∑
q=1
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −Xℓ)1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)−
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
L
L
nI
L∑
{j:Ij=I}
I∑
q=1
ωgI,R,jK1g,hg(Xj −Xℓ)K2g,hg(Bqj −Bpℓ)
]
(B-4)
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where we have used the following notations:
KG,hG(Xj −Xℓ) =
1
hG
KG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
, (B-5)
K1g,hg (Xj −Xℓ) =
1
hg
K1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
, (B-6)
K2g,hg (Bqj −Bpℓ) =
1
hg
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
, (B-7)
ωGI,R+1,j = e
T
1
(
XTI,R+1W
G
x XI,R+1
nI
)−1
XR+1,j , (B-8)
ωgI,R,j = e
T
1
(
XTI,RW
g
xXI,R
nI
)−1
XR,j . (B-9)
Now using (B-4) in the first line of (B-10), we get
B11 =
√
L
(
1
L2
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
L∑
{j:Ij=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
I∑
q=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −Xℓ)1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg(Xj −Xℓ)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bpℓ)
])
. (B-10)
The term between parenthesis in (B-10) can be decomposed as follows:
1) Diagonal terms (ℓ = j, p = q)
RL =
1
L2
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(0)1(Bpℓ ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg (0)K2g,hg(0)
]
, (B-11)
2) Off-diagonal terms (ℓ 6= j)
L(L− 1)
L2
UL =
1
L2
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
L∑
{j:Ij=I,j 6=ℓ}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
I∑
q=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −Xℓ)1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −Xℓ)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bpℓ)
]
. (B-12)
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From (B-11) and (B-12) we have the expression in the last line of (B-10). It remains to show that B11 =
B111 +B112 = oas(1). We consider first B111 =
√
LRL in (B-10). Specifically,
B111 =
√
L‖RL‖ =
√
L
∥∥∥∥∥
(
1
L2
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(0)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg (0)K2g,hg(0)
])∥∥∥∥∥
=
√
L
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L LnI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
ωGI,R+1,j
KG,hG(0)
L
− G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
ωgI,R,j
K1g,hg(0)K2g,hg (0)
L
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤

 1
L
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
‖m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)‖2


1
2
√
L
(
1
L
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
1
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)2
[
ωGI,R+1,j
KG,hG(0)
L
− G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
ωgI,R,j
K1g,hg(0)K2g,hg (0)
L
]2) 1
2
= CD,
where the inequality comes from Cauchy-Schwartz. First we show that C2 < ∞. Using A6-(vi), 0 <
(1/(I − 1)) < 1 for each I ∈ I and L/nI = L/(ILI) <∞ we get
C2 =
1
L
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
‖m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)‖2 ≤ L
nI
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
1
I(I − 1) supθ∈Θ ‖m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ)‖
2
<
1
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
K7(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I)
2 = E[K7(V,X, I)
2] + oas(1) <∞.
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It remains to consider the D term above. Namely,
D ≤
√
L
(
1
L
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
1
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)2
[
ωGI,R+1,j
KG(0)
LhG
− G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
ωgI,R,j
K1g,hg (0)K2g,hg(0)
Lh2g
]2) 1
2
=
√
L
(
1
L
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
1
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)2
[
Op(1)Op
(
1
LhG
)
− G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
Op(1)Op
(
1
Lh2g
)]2) 12
<
√
Lκ1
[
Op
(
1
LhG
)
− κ2Op
(
1
Lh2g
)]
= κ1
[
Op
(
1√
LhG
)
− κ2Op
(
1√
Lh2g
)]
= κ1[op(1)− κ2op(1)] = op(1),
where after the first equality we use (B-5)- (B-9). The second line follows from observing that
ωGI,R+1,j = e
T
1
(
XTI,R+1W
G
x XI,R+1
nI
)−1
XR+1,j = e
T
1
[
1
nIhG
nI∑
ι=1
x
T
ι xιKG
(
xι − xj
hg
)]−1
e1 = Op(1),
and similarly for ωgI,R,j . The third line uses the fact that densities are bounded away from zero and 0 <
(1/I(I − 1)) < 1 for all I. The last line follows from Assumption A4.AN. Thus, B111 = CD = o(1) as
desired. Let Ypℓ = (Bpℓ, Xℓ) and for each I define rL(Ypℓ, I) = E[pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))|(Ypℓ, I)], where pL(·, ·)
is a symmetric function, and
θL = E[rL(Ypℓ, I)] = E[pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))]; UˆL = θL +
2
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
[rL(Ypℓ, I)− θL].
Next, we consider B112 in (B-10)
B112 =
L(L− 1)
L2
√
LUL =
L(L− 1)
L2
√
L(UL − UˆL) + L(L− 1)
L2
√
LUˆL = B1121 +B1122, (B-13)
where UL can be written as a U-statistic.
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Namely,
UL =
1
L(L− 1)
L
nI
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
L∑
{j:Ij=I,j 6=ℓ}
1
I(I − 1)
I∑
p=1
I∑
q=1
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −Xℓ)1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg(Xj −Xℓ)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bpℓ)
]
=
1
L(L− 1)
L−1∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
L∑
{j:Ij=I,j=ℓ+1}
1
I
I∑
p=1
I∑
q=1
{
L
nI(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −Xℓ)1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg(Xj −Xℓ)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bpℓ)
]}
=
2
L(L− 1)
L−1∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
L∑
{j:Ij=I,j=ℓ+1}
1
I
I∑
p=1
I∑
q=1
[
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)K
∗∗(Bpℓ, Bqj , Xℓ, Xj , I)
2
+
m1(Vqj , Xj, I; θ0)K
∗∗(Bqj , Bpℓ, Xj , Xℓ, I)
2
]
=

 L
2


−1
L−1∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
L∑
{j:Ij=I,j=ℓ+1}
1
I
I∑
p=1
I∑
q=1
pL ((Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), (Bqj , Xj, I)) .
Now we prove B1121 =
√
L(UL−UˆL) = op(1). By Lemma 3.1 in Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989) it is enough
to show that E[‖pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))‖2] = o(L). We will show that E[‖pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))‖2|I] = o(L), which
implies the above condition.
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E[‖pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))‖2|I ] =
∫
‖pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))‖2g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
=
1
4
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥ LnI(I − 1)m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I ; θ0)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
1
hG
ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
h2g
ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)]
+
L
nI(II − 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , I ; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
[
1
hG
ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
−G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
1
h2g
ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
=
1
4
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥
[
L
nII(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I ; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
hG
ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
+
L
nI(I − 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , I ; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
1
hG
ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
]
+
[
L
nI(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I ; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
h2g
ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
L
nI(I − 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , I ; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
1
h2g
ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
=
1
4
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥ 1hG LnI
[
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I ; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
+
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , I ; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
]
+
1
h2g
L
nI
[
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I ; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
1
I − 1
m1(Vqj , Xj , I ; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
≤ 1
2
∫ {∥∥∥∥∥ LnI 1hG
[
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I ; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
+
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , I ; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥ LnII 1h2g
[
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I ; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , I ; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2}
g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
= C +D, (B-14)
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where the inequality comes from using (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2). Therefore, now we need to show that both C
and D are o(L). We consider first the C term in (B-14), and note that we can write Vpℓ = ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I). It
gives
C =
1
2h2G
∫ (
L
nI
1
(I − 1)
)2 ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), Xℓ, I; θ0)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ωGI,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
=
1
2
∫ (
L
nI
1
(I − 1)
)2 ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj , I; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , I) ωGI,R+1,jKG(−u2)
1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj) + m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(u2)1(u1hG +Bqj ≤ Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(uhG + Yqj |I)g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj
≤
∫ [∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj, I; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , I) ωGI,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ωGI,R+1,jKG(u2)1(u1hG +Bqj ≤ Bqj)
∥∥∥∥
2
]
g0(uhG + Yqj |I)g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj
= C1 + C2,
where we have used the change of variable u =
Ypℓ − Yqj
hG
=
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hG
,
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
= (u1, u2), and the
inequality comes from using (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) and
(
L
nI
1
(I−1)
)2
<∞.
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Next we consider C1
C1 =
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj , I; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , I) ωGI,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(uhG + Yqj |I)g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj
=
∫ ∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj , I; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , I)
∥∥∥∥
2 ∥∥ωGI,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)∥∥2
g0(uhG + Yqj |I)g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj
=
∫
‖m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj, I; θ0)‖2
∥∥ωGI,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)∥∥2
g0(uhG + Yqj |I)g(Yqj |I)
g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj, I)2 dudYqj
≤
∫
‖m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj , I; θ0)‖2
∥∥ωGI,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)∥∥2
g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj ,
where the last inequality comes from the assumption that densities are bounded. By the Lebesgue Dominated
Convergence (LDC) Theorem and A6-(vi), the above integral converges to
∫
‖Op(1)KG(−u2)‖2 du
∫
‖m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)‖2g0(Yqj |I)dYqj <∞.
Hence, C1 = o(L) as L→∞. A similar argument can be used to show that C2 = o(L) as L→∞. Therefore,
C = C1 + C2 = o(L).
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Next we consider the D term in (B-14). Namely
D =
1
2
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥ LnI
1
h2g
[
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
1
(I − 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj, I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,j
K1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
=
1
2h4g
(
L
nI
1
(I − 1)
)2 ∫ ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), Xℓ, I; θ0)g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,j
K1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Ypℓ|I)g0(Yqj |I)dYpℓdYqj
≤ 1
2h2g
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj , I; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj, I)
G0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj, I)
g0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , I)
ωgI,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj, I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(uhg + Yqj |I)g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj
≤ 1
h2g
∫ [∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj , I; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj, I)
G0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj, I)
g0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,j
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥m1(Vqj , Xj, I; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1)
∥∥∥∥
2
]
g0(uhg + Yqj |I)g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj
= D1 +D2,
where we have used the change of variable u =
Ypℓ − Yqj
hg
=
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
,
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
= (u1, u2), and the first
inequality follows from the fact that
(
L
nI
1
(I−1)
)2
<∞ and the second inequality uses (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2).
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We consider first D1. Specifically,
D1 =
1
h2g
∫ ∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , I), u2hg +Xj , I; θ0)G0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , I)∥∥∥2
∥∥∥ωgI,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)∥∥∥2 g0(uhg + Yqj |I)g0(Yqj |I)g0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , I)4 dudYqj
≤ 1
h2g
∫
‖m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , I), u2hg +Xj , I; θ0)‖2
∥∥∥ωgI,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)∥∥∥2
g0(Yqj |I)dudYqj ,
where the inequality uses the fact that G(·|·, I) is bounded and that densities are bounded from above. By
the LDC Theorem and A6-(vi) the above integral converges to
∫
‖Op(1)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)‖2 du
∫
‖m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)‖2 g0(Yqj |I)dYqj <∞.
Hence, D1 = o(L) if and only if Lh
2
g →∞ as implied by A4.AN-(ii) since, Lh2g =
√
L
√
Lh2g →∞. A similar
argument can be used to show that D2 = o(L). That is, D2 = o(L) if and only if Lh
2
g → ∞, as implied by
A4.AN-(ii). Therefore, C +D = C1 +C2+D1+D2 = o(L) and the desired result follows, i.e by Lemma 3.1
in Powell, Stock and Stoker (1989)
√
L(UL − UˆL) = op(1).
Next we consider the second term in (B-13)
B1122 =
L(L− 1)
L2
√
LUˆL =
L(L− 1)
L2
√
L

θL + 2L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
[rL(Ypℓ, I)− θL]


=
L(L− 1)
L2
√
LE[pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))] +
L(L− 1)
L2
√
L
2
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
[rL(Ypℓ, I)− θL].(B-15)
Next, we show that the first term in (B-15) is oas(1). Consider only the expectation part in the first term
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in (B-15). Namely
E[pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))]
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫ {
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −Xℓ)1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
−G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −Xℓ)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bpℓ)
]
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
[
ωGI,R+1,jKG,hG(Xℓ −Xj)1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
−G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg (Xℓ −Xj)K2g,hg (Bpℓ −Bqj)
]}
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj , I)dYpℓdYqj
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
hG
[
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
]
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj , I)dYpℓdYqj
−1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
h2g
[
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj, I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj, I)dYpℓdYqj
= A1 −A2. (B-16)
We consider first A1.
‖A1‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 LnI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
hG
[
m1(ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ) + m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
]
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj , I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ‖A11‖+ ‖A12‖
It is enough to show that ‖A11‖ = oas(1/
√
L) since the same argument can be used to show that
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‖A12‖ = oas(1/
√
L). We observe the following
‖A11‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 LnI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
hG
[
m1(ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
]
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj , I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
1
hG
m1(ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj, I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
1
hG
m1(ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), Xℓ, I; θ0)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
= hG
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj, I; θ0)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(−u2)
1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)g0(uhG + Yqj , I)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ hG
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , I), u2hG +Xj, I; θ0)KG(−u2)
1(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)g0(uhG + Yqj , I)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥, (B-17)
where we have used the change of variable u =
Ypℓ − Yqj
hG
=
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hG
,
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
= (u1, u2) and the fact
that densities are bounded. The last inequality comes from observing that ωGI,R+1,j = Op(1). Now consider
the expectation inside the norm of the term above evaluated at hG = 0, namely
∑
I
∫∫
m1(ξ(Yqj , I), Xj , I; θ0)g0(Yqj , I)dYqj =
∑
I
∫ [∫
m1(ξ(Yqj , I), Xj, I; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , I)dBqj
]
fm(Xj , I)dXj
=
∑
I
E[m1(V,X, I; θ0)],
where we use A3-(ii) and the Law of Iterated Expectations. The last line in the expression above follows
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from observing that the integral inside can be solved by using integration by parts twice, as follows:
∫ B(Xj ,I)
B(Xj)
m1(ξ(Bqj , Xj , I), Xj , I; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , I)dBqj
= m1(ξ(B(Xj , I), Xj , I), Xj, I; θ0)G0(B(Xj , I)|Xj , I)−m1(ξ(B(Xj), Xj , I), Xj , I; θ0)
G0(B(Xj)|Xj , I)−
∫ B(Xj ,I)
B(Xj)
m11(ξ(Bqj , Xj, I), Xj , I; θ0)G0(Bqj |Xj , I)dBqj
= m1(V ,Xj , I; θ0)−
∫ B(Xj ,I)
B(Xj)
m11(ξ(Bqj , Xj, I), Xj , I; θ0)G0(Bqj |Xj , I)dBqj
= m1(V ,Xj , I; θ0)−m1(ξ(B(Xj , I), Xj , I), Xj , I; θ0)G0(B(Xj , I)|Xj , I)
+m1(ξ(B(Xj), Xj , I), Xj ; θ0)G0(B(Xj)|Xj , I) +
∫ B(Xj ,I)
B(Xj)
m1(ξ(Bqj , Xj, I), Xj , I; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , I)dBqj
= m1(V ,Xj , I; θ0)−m1(V ,Xj, I; θ0) +
∫ B(Xj ,I)
B(Xj)
m1(ξ(Bqj , Xj , I), Xj , I; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , I)dBqj
=
∫ V (Xj ,I)
V (Xj ,I)
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)f(Vqj |Xj , I)dVqj = E[m1(V,X, I; θ0)|X, I],
where the fifth equality usesG0(Bqj |Xj, I) = F (ξ(Bqj , Xj , I)|Xj , I), so that g0(Bqj |Xj, I) = f(Vqj |Xj , I)ξ1(Bqj , Xj , I).
Therefore at hG = 0 the integral inside the norm in (B-17) exists by A6-(vii). Thus, we can apply a Taylor
expansion of order R+ 1 in the RHS of (B-17) around hG to obtain
‖A11‖ ≤ hG
∑
I
∥∥∥∥d1hG + d2h2G2 + . . .+ dRh
R
G
R!
+O(hR+1G )
∥∥∥∥
=
∑
I
∥∥∥∥∥d1h2G + d2 h
3
G
2
+ . . .+ dR
hR+1G
R!
+O(hR+2G )
∥∥∥∥∥ .
We note that the remainder term vanishes, i.e.
√
LhR+2G = o(1), and also that
√
LhR+1G = o(1), by A4.AN-
(I). The remaining R− 1 terms also vanish by A3-(iii), i.e, since the kernels are of order R− 1. To see this
observe that the kth coordinate of dρ, ρ = 1, . . . , R− 1 is
dkρ =
∂ρ
∂hρG
∫
[Hk(uhG + Y )−Hk(uhG + Y )]KG(−u2)du
∣∣∣
hG=0
=
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)KG(−u2)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du
−
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)KG(−u2)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du = 0,
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where dHk/dY (y) = m1,k(ξ(y, I), x, I; θ0)g0(y, I). The third equality uses A3-(iii), that is since KG(·) is a
higher order kernel, all moments of order strictly smaller than R− 1 vanish. It remains to consider now A2
in (B-16). Namely
‖A2‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 LnI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
h2g
[
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj, I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ‖A21‖+ ‖A22‖.
We show only that A21 = oas(1/
√
L) since a similar argument can be used to show that A22 = oas(1/
√
L).
We observe the following
‖A21‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 LnI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
h2g
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
ωgI,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj , I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
1
h2g
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I) ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj , I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
1
h2g
m1(ξ(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), Xℓ, I; θ0)ω
g
I,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
g0(Bpℓ, Xℓ, I)g0(Bqj , Xj, I)dYpℓdYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , I), u2 +Xj , I; θ0)ω
g
I,R,jK1g,hg (−u2)K2g,hg(−u1)
g0(uhg + Yqj , I)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
I
∫
m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , I), u2 +Xj , I; θ0)K1g,hg (−u2)K2g,hg (−u1)g0(uhg + Yqj , I)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥,
where we have used that (1/2)(L/nI)1/(I−1) ≤ ∞ and also that densities are bounded. The last equality uses
the change of variable u = (Ypℓ − Yqj)/hg and the last inequality comes from observing that ωgI,R,j = Op(1).
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We observe that A21 can be expanded as a Taylor series of order R in the bandwidth hg. Moreover,
A21|hg=0 <∞ by A6-(vii) as we have already shown above for A11|hG=0 <∞. Then, we can apply a Taylor
expansion around hg to obtain
‖A21‖ ≤
∑
Ij
∥∥∥∥∥c1hg + c2 h
2
g
2
+ . . .+ cR−1
hR−1g
(R − 1)! +O(h
R
g )
∥∥∥∥∥ .
We note that the remainder term vanishes, i.e.
√
LhRg = o(1) by A4.AN-(ii). The remaining R − 1 terms
also vanish by A3-(iii). To see this observe that the kth coordinate of cρ, ρ = 1, . . . , R− 1 is
ckρ =
∂ρ
∂hρg
∫
[Hk(uhg + Y )−Hk(uhg + Y )]K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)du|hg=0
=
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du
−
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du = 0,
where dHk/dY (y) = m1,k(ξ(y, I), x, I; θ0)g0(y, I). The third equality uses A3-(iii), that is since K1g(·) and
K2g(·) are higher order kernels, all moments of order strictly smaller than R − 1 vanish. This shows that
the first term in (B-15) indeed is oas(1). We still have to show that the second term in (B-15) is Op(1). In
fact we will not only show that we will also provide the asymptotic linear representation, which gives us the
asymptotic variance. From Equation (B-15) we have
√
L(θˆ − θ0)−
√
L(θ˜ − θ0) = L(L− 1)
L2
2√
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
[rL(Ypℓ, I)− θL]
where, Ypℓ = (Bpℓ, Xℓ) and rL(Ypℓ, I) = E[pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))|(Ypℓ, I)] and θL = E[rL(Ypℓ, I)] = E[pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))].
First, we show that
rL(Ypℓ, I) = −
∑
I
1
I(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I) + tL(Ypℓ, I).
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We observe that
rL(Ypℓ, I) = E[pL((Ypℓ, I), (Yqj , I))|(Ypℓ, I)]
=
{ ∫
pL((Bpℓ, Xℓ, I), (Bqj , Xj , I))g0(Bqj , Xj , I)dYqj if ℓ 6= j∫
pL((Bpj , Xj , I), (Bqj , Xj , I))g0((Bpj , Xj , I), (Bqj , Xj, I)|(Bpj , Xj , I))dYqj if ℓ = j.
We consider first the case ℓ 6= j.
rL(Ypℓ, I) =
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
{∫ [
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
hG
ωGI,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj, I)
1
hG
ωGI,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
]
g0(Yqj , I)dYqj
}
−1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
{∫ [
m1(Vpℓ, Xℓ, I; θ0)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
G0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
g0(Bpℓ|Xℓ, I)
1
h2g
ωgI,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj, I; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
G0(Bqj |Xj , I)
g0(Bqj |Xj , I)
1
h2g
ωgI,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]
g0(Yqj , I)dYqj
}
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
{∫ [
M(Ypℓ, I)
1
hG
ωGI,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −Xℓ
hG
)
1(Bqj ≤ Bpℓ)
+M(Yqj , I)
1
hG
ωGI,R+1,jKG
(
Xℓ −Xj
hG
)
1(Bpℓ ≤ Bqj)
]
g0(Yqj , I)dYqj
}
−1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
{∫ [
N(Ypℓ, I)
1
h2g
ωgI,R,jK1g
(
Xj −Xℓ
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bpℓ
hg
)
+N(Yqj , I)
1
h2g
ωgI,R,jK1g
(
Xℓ −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bpℓ −Bqj
hg
)]
g0(Yqj , I)dYqj
}
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(u2)1(Bpℓ ≤ u1hG +Bpℓ) +M(uhG + Ypℓ, I)
ωGI,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(u1hG +Bpℓ ≤ Bpℓ)
]
g0(uhG + Ypℓ, I)du
−1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫ [
N(Ypℓ, I)ω
g
I,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1) +N(uhg + Ypℓ, I)
ωgI,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
]
g0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)du.
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We note that as h = (hG, hg)→ 0 we have
rL(Ypℓ, I) −→ −1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫ [
N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)K1g(u)]K1g(u2)K2g(u1)
+N(Ypℓ, Ij)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
]
g0(Ypℓ, I)du
= −1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
where we have used the following
ωgI,R,j = e
T
1
[
1
nIhg
nI∑
ι=1
xιxι
TK1g
(
Xι −Xℓ
hg
)]−1
[1 (Xj −Xℓ) . . . (Xj −Xℓ)R−1]T
= eT1
[
1
nIhg
nI∑
ι=1
xιxι
TK1g
(
Xι −Xℓ
hg
)]−1
[1 (−u2hg) . . . (−u2hg)R−1]T
p−→ eT1
[
E
(
xιxι
TK1g
(
Xι −Xℓ
hg
))]−1
e1 = f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)
therefore we define
rL(Ypℓ, Ij) = −1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I) + tL(Ypℓ, I).
We consider now the reminder term tL(Ypℓ, I)
tL(Ypℓ, I) = rL(Ypℓ, I) +
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(u2)1(Bpℓ ≤ u1hG +Bpℓ)
+M(uhG + Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(u1hG +Bpℓ ≤ Bpℓ)
]
g0(uhG + Ypℓ, I)du
−1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫ [
N(Ypℓ, I)ω
g
I,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1) +N(uhg + Ypℓ, I)
ωgI,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
]
g0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)du
+
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
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Now, using
∫
K1g(u2)K2g(u1)du = 1, we can write
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I) =
1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
K1g(u2)K2g(u1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)du
+
1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)N(Ypℓ, I)f−1m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)du
therefore we can write the reminder term as follows
tL(Ypℓ, Ij) =
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(u2)1(Bpℓ ≤ u1hG +Bpℓ)
+M(uhG + Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(u1hG +Bpℓ ≤ Bpℓ)
]
g0(uhG + Ypℓ, I)du
−1
2
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
L
iLi
N(Ypℓ, I)ω
g
I,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1)g0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)du
−1
2
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
L
iLi
N(uhg + Ypℓ, I)ω
g
I,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)g0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)du
+
1
2
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
I
N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)g0(Ypℓ, I)du
+
1
2
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
I
N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)g0(Ypℓ, I)du
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(u2)1(Bpℓ ≤ u1hG +Bpℓ)
+M(uhG + Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(u1hG +Bpℓ ≤ Bpℓ)
]
g0(uhG + Ypℓ, I)du
−1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
N(Ypℓ, I)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)
[
L
LI
ωgI,R,jg0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)− f−1m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
]
du
−1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
[
L
LI
ωgI,R,jN(uhg + Ypℓ, I)g0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)− f−1m (Xℓ, I)N(Ypℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
]
du
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(u2)1(Bpℓ ≤ u1hG +Bpℓ)
+M(uhG + Ypℓ, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(u1hG +Bpℓ ≤ Bpℓ)
]
g0(uhG + Ypℓ, I)du
−1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
N(Ypℓ, I)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)
[
f−1m (Xℓ, I) + oas(1)
]
[g0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)− g0(Ypℓ, I)]du
−1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
[
f−1m (Xℓ, I) + oas(1)
]
[N(uhg + Ypℓ, I)g0(uhg + Ypℓ, I)−N(Ypℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)]du
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thus using the above expression we have
2√
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
[rL(Ypℓ, I)− θL] = 2√
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
{
− 1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
+E
[1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
]
+ tL(Ypℓ, I)− E[tL(Ypℓ, I)]
}
= − 2√
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
{
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
−E
[1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypℓ, I)f
−1
m (Xℓ, I)g0(Ypℓ, I)
]}
+
2√
L
L∑
{ℓ:Iℓ=I}
1
I
I∑
p=1
[
tL(Ypℓ, I)− E[tL(Ypℓ, I)]
]
.
We denote the second term above by TL and we observe that E[TL] = 0. We now show that var[TL] = oas(1).
var[TL] = 4
LI
L
var
[
1
I
I∑
p=1
t1(Yp1, I)
]
= 4
LI
L
E
{
var
[
1
I
I∑
p=1
t1(Yp1, I)
∣∣∣∣∣I
]}
+ 4
LI
L
var
{
E
[
1
I
I∑
p=1
t1(Yp1, I)
∣∣∣∣∣I
]}
= 4
LI
L
E
{
1
I
var
[
t1(Yp1, I)
∣∣∣∣∣I
]}
+ 4
LI
L
var
{
E [t1(Yp1, I)|I]
}
= A+B. (B-18)
We consider first the kth coordinate of the conditional variance inside the A term above, namely
var
[
t1k(Yp1, I)
∣∣∣I] ≤ E [t1k(Yp1, I)2∣∣∣I] ≤ O (h2G)+O (h2(R−1)g ) ,
where the last inequality comes from observing that
t1k(Yp1, I) =
1
2
L
iLi
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Yp1, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(u2)1(Bp1 ≤ u1hG +Bp1)
+M(uhG + Yp1, I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(−u2)1(u1hG +Bp1 ≤ Bp1)
]
g0(uhG + Yp1, I)du
−1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
N(Yp1, I)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)f
−1
m (X1, I)
[g0(uhg + Yp1, I)− g0(Yp1, I)]du
−1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)f−1m (X1, I)[N(uhg + Yp1, I)
g0(uhg + Yp1, I)−N(Yp1, I)g0(Yp1, I)]du+ oas(1) = a+ b+ c+ oas(1).
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Therefore, applying (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) twice yields (a+ b+ c)2 ≤ κ(a2 + b2 + c2), and thus
E
[
t1k(Yp1, I)
2
∣∣∣I] = E[(a+ b+ c)2|I] + oas(1) ≤ 4E[a2 + b2 + c2|I] + oas(1)
= O
(
h2G
)
+O
(
h2(R−1)g
)
+O
(
h2(R−1)g
)
,
where the order of the last two terms after the last equality follows from (R− 1)th Taylor Expansion around
Yp1 and the kernels are of order R− 1 by A.3-(iii). Next, we consider B in (B-18):
B
4
=
LI
L
var
{
E [t1(Yp1, I)|I]
}
≤ E
{
E [t1(Yp1, I)|I]2
}
≤ E
{
E
[
t1(Yp1, I)
2|I] }
≤ O (h2G)+O (h2(R−1)g )+O (h2(R−1)g ) ,
where the last inequality follows from the same argument used above. Hence, by Chebyshev Inequality
TL = op(1). We consider now the case ℓ = j and observe the following
rL(Ypj , I) = E[pL((Bpj , Xj, I), (Bqj , Xj , I))|(Bpj , Xj, I)]
=
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
hG
[
M(Ypj , I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(0)1(Bqj ≤ Bpj)
+M(Yqj , I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(0)1(Bpj ≤ Bqj)
]
g0((Ypj , I), (Yqj , I)|(Ypj , I))dYqj
−1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
1
h2g
[
N(Ypj , I)ω
g
I,R,jK1g(0)K2g
(
Bqj −Bpj
hg
)
+N(Yqj , I)ω
g
I,R,jK1g(0)K2g
(
Bpj −Bqj
hg
)]
g0((Ypj , I), (Yqj , I)|(Ypj , I))dYqj .
Making the change of variables u = (Yqj − Ypj)/hG and u˜ = (Yqj − Ypj)/hg gives
rL(Ypj , I) =
1
2
L
nI
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Ypj , I)ω
G
I,R+1,jKG(0)1(u1hG +Bpj ≤ Bpj) +M(uhG + Ypj , I)
ωGI,R+1,jKG(0)1(Bpj ≤ u1hG +Bpj)
]
g0((Ypj , I), (uhG + Ypj , I)|(Ypj , I))du
−1
2
L
iLi
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫ [
N(Ypj , I)ω
g
I,R,jK1g(0)K2g(u˜1) +N(u˜hg + Ypj , I)
ωgI,R,jK1g(0)K2g(−u˜1)
]
g0((Ypj , I), (uhg + Ypj , I)|(Ypj , I))du˜.
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Next, we observe that as h = (hG, hg)→ 0 we have
rL(Ypj , I) → −1
2
1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)
∫ [
N(Ypj , I)f
−1
m (Xj , I)K1g(0)K2g(u˜1)
+N(Ypj , I)f
−1
m (Xj , I)K1g(0)K2g(−u˜1)
]
g0((Ypj , I), (Ypj , I)|(Ypj , I))du˜
= −1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypj , I)f
−1
m (Xj , I)g0(Ypj , I),
and, as before, we define
rL(Ypj , I) = −1
I
∑
I
1
(I − 1)N(Ypj , I)f
−1
m (Xj , I)g0(Ypj , I) + tL(Ypj , I).
The rest of the proof is analogous to the one for the case ℓ 6= j. Next, we consider B12 in (B-2):
‖B12‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
m1(Vpℓ,Zℓ;θ0)
√
L
[
1
gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
(
G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
[gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)]2−
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)−G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
]
[gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)]
)]∥∥∥∥∥
≤
(
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖2
) 1
2
{
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
L
[
1
gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
(
G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ) [gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)]
−
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)−G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
] [
gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
])]2} 12
= B121B122,
where the inequality comes from Cauchy-Schwartz. First we show that B2121 <∞ then we show B122 = o(1).
B2121 =
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖2 ≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
‖m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ)‖2
≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
K7(Vpℓ, Zℓ)
2 ≤ 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K7(Vpℓ, Zℓ)
2 = E[K7(V, Z)
2] + oas(1) <∞
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where the second inequality follows from A6-(vi) and 0 < 1/(Iℓ − 1) ≤ 1. Next we show that B122 = o(1).
B122=
{
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
L
[
1
gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
(
G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
[
gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
]2
−
[
Gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)−G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
] [
gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
])]2} 12
<
√
L
{
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ(Iℓ − 1)
Iℓ∑
p=1
[
κ1
(
κ2O
(
1
rg2
)
−O
(
1
rG
)
O
(
1
rg
))]2} 12
≤
√
Lκ1
[
κ2O
(
1
rg2
)
−O
(
1
rG
)
O
(
1
rg
)]
= κ1
[
κ2O
(√
L
rg2
)
−O
( √
L
rGrg
)]
= o(1),
where we have used:
∣∣∣∣∣ 1gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
∣∣∣∣∣ < κ1 <∞, and
∣∣∣∣∣G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)
∣∣∣∣∣ < κ2 <∞ since the densities are
bounded away from zero and gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ) a.s−→ g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ) from Proposition B2 in GPV (2000);
O
(
1
r2g
)
=
∣∣∣gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)∣∣∣2 = O
(
h2R1g + h
2R
2g +
logL
Lh1gh2g
)
,
O
(
1
rG
)
O
(
1
rg
)
=
∣∣∣Gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)−G0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)∣∣∣∣∣∣gˆ(Bpℓ|Zℓ)− g0(Bpℓ|Zℓ)∣∣∣
= O
(
hR+1G +
√
logL
LhG
)
O
(
hR1g + h
R
2g +
√
logL
Lh1gh2g
)
;
and ∀ℓ, 0 < 1/(Iℓ − 1) ≤ 1. Therefore, B12 = o(1) = o(1) in (B-2). Next, we consider B2 in (B-1)
Step 3.2
‖B2‖ ≤
√
L
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
‖m1(Vpℓ, Zℓ; θ0)−m1(V ∗pℓ, Zℓ; θ0)‖|Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ|
≤
√
L
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K6(Zℓ)|Vpℓ − V ∗pℓ||Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ| ≤
√
L
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
1
Iℓ
Iℓ∑
p=1
K6(Zℓ)(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ)2
≤
√
L sup
p,ℓ
(Vˆpℓ − Vpℓ)2 1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
K6(Zℓ) =
√
LOas
(
1
r2
)
Oas(1) ≤ Oas
(√
L
r2
)
Oas(1)
= Oas
(
L1/4
r
)
Oas(1) = oas(1), (B-19)
where the second inequality follows from A6-(v), the third from Vˆpℓ ≤ V ∗pℓ ≤ Vpℓ and the last from A4.AN.
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